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Abstract

Studies have largely portrayed individual resistance as a pervasive, irrational and
problematic response to organizational change initiatives. The current study confronts
this interpretation with a model of attitudinal inconsistency that provides a more holistic
perspective of the individual during times of change. Inconsistency reveals the degree to
which the mental evaluations of a change initiative may conflict and produce weak
attitudinal foundations to govern behavior. Measuring affective-cognitive consistency,
the tests in this study demonstrate that employees may form inconsistent attitudes
towards a change initiative. These inconsistent attitudes are comprised of varying shades
of resistance and support. As the first of two novels contribution to the literature,
inconsistency relates negatively to the perceived quality of management transition
techniques such as participation, communication, structured procedure, managerial
supportiveness, and supervisor supportiveness. In a second test, consistency also serves a
role in the process of attitudinal change. Consistency partially mediates all five of the
above predictors of openness to change. Post hoc analysis provides further evidence of
the importance of a supportive culture in reducing inconsistency. Taken together, these
results should cause some pause in the criticism of resistance. The mental processes
behind perceived resistant attitudes and behaviors may display consequential dimensions
beyond uniform negativity.
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PREDICTORS AND PREDICTIVE EFFECTS OF ATTITUDINAL INCONSISTENCY
TOWARDS ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
I. Introduction
Organizations face a business environment today that demands regular, if not
constant, self-awareness and attentiveness to practices (Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Cole,
Harris, & Bernerth, 2005). Organizational transformation – perhaps once a discrete act in
the history of an organization – now represents an existential state, whereby an
organization either continues to evolve, or risks inconsequentiality in their respective
fields (Isabella, 1990). To a contemporary ear, the adage “Adapt or Die” should sound
like a familiar governing principle for organizational practices. The exogenous culprits
in this scenario are many. Globalization, competition, technological evolution, as well as
social, political and environmental change have all put pressures on organizations to
dispose of antiquated business practices (Beer & Walton, 1987; Kickul, Lester, & Finkl,
2002; Kotter, 2006).
And yet many organizations find the ability to change elusive. Studies repeatedly
draw the conclusion that true success is uncommon (e.g., By, 2005; Gilmore, Schea, &
Unseem., 1997). A recent global survey reveals that only one-third of organizational
change efforts succeeded in the eyes of their leaders (Meaney & Pung, 2008).
Transformation may account for one of the most challenging events a corporation can
face (Isabella, 1990). Given that transformations frequently fail, the evolution of industry
may best be described as a path marked not just by adaption, but by tentative fits and
1

starts. Such an arduous path of progress has financial implications for organizations,
psychological implications for the individuals in its path, and existential implications for
all vested parties.
Organizational behavior research has sought to understand why change has
proven difficult for organizations. One perspective implicates institutional rigidities, and
deficient organizational cultures (e.g., Burke & Litwin, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). Another directly implicates the resistance of employees (e.g., Waldersee &
Griffiths, 1997; Wanberg & Banas, 2000). This latter emphasis has revealed that facing
change triggers highly complex psychological processes leading to uncertain ends. For
instance, employees may experience frustration, uncertainty, anxiety, and defensiveness
(Bovey and Hede, 2001a; 2001b; Piderit, 2000). To embrace change, employees may
have to cope with stress, face personal challenges to their abilities and routines, and tap
into requisite mental flexibility (Oreg, 2003). Employees may even have to wrestle with
concepts elemental to their being, namely the validity and worth of their own perceptions,
beliefs, and values (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993). This body of knowledge
suitably frames the complexity of achieving support for institutional change, and provides
some answers as to why transformation efforts often fail.

Problem Statement
The study of employee resistance relies significantly on research from the prolific
science of social psychology. However, several recent critiques have argued that these
psychological excursions have transpired in an eclectic and divergent fashion (e.g.,
Piderit, 2000; Erwin & Garmin, 2009). Additionally, these critiques note that
2

psychologically-based studies of resistance have not always applied solid or
contemporary principles of psychology. These and other studies (e.g., Fisher, 2000;
Oreg, 2006) have begun to reference a more refined and comprehensive model from
social psychology, namely the multidimensional attitude, as a way to synthesize
divergent findings and to update the perspective of resistance research. However,
empirical applications of a multidimensional form of attitude remain in short supply (e.g.,
Oreg & Sverdlik, 2011). As such, resistance research continues to perpetuate an
impression that would appear incongruent with the field of social psychology. That
dubious impression is that employees resist in a wholly negative, irrational manner
towards sound corporate objectives (Ford, Ford, & D’Amelio, 2008). A
multidimensional perspective of attitude should significantly qualify this pejorative
subtext within contemporary resistance research.
In the present study, we apply this encompassing and multidimensional construct
of attitude. Specifically, we bring attention to one of its many demonstrated attributes,
inconsistency. Inconsistency addresses a type of psychological response largely missing,
and almost completely untested, in the discussion of resistance: the conflicted attitudinal
response. Within social psychology, the study of inconsistency has already resolved the
“troublesome eddies” of an arbitrarily constrained perception of attitude such as that
which still endures in resistance studies (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 1997, p. 15).
Moreover, inconsistency has served as an example of the capacity of a multidimensional
attitude to synthesize and reformulate discrepancies in traditional measures (e.g.,
Schleicher, Greguras, & Watt, 2004). In these capacities, inconsistency should serve to
3

unveil the inadequacy of the claim that resistance stems from a fully negative and
irrational mental platform.

Research Focus
Social psychology defines attitude as the tendency or bias an individual
experiences in evaluating an issue (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). Attitudes build on the
foundation of our values, beliefs, opinions, and experiences; thereafter, attitudes work as
a shortcut tool used to process new information quickly, and for making a judgment
(Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1997). Attitudes have persisted as an important item of interest
because they tend to predict behavior. Individuals do not comfortably act in conflict with
their values, beliefs, and opinions that inform their attitudes. Because of the predictive
power of attitudes, they have served as perhaps the most prolific construct in social
psychology throughout the 20th century (Ajzen, 2001; Cacioppo et al., 1997; Gawronski,
2007). However, despite the wealth of findings within social psychology, resistance
research fails to adequately employ attitude. This deficiency is peculiar considering that
prominent models recognize that a high level of an openness to change (a plausible
candidate for an attitude) proves critical in producing “readiness” for change (e.g.,
Armenakis at al., 1993).
In the details, resistance studies (and, for the large part, all of organizational
behavior) have parted ways with social psychology. Organizational behavior studies
have generally modeled attitude as fixed and dispositional (e.g. Gerhart, 1987; Straw &
Ross, 1985), as well as internally homogenous, that is, measurable simply as either
positive or negative (e.g., Wanberg & Banas, 2000). While the fixedness concept has
4

begun to erode (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001),
the assumption of homogeneity remains quite firm despite the fact that psychology has
long demonstrated otherwise (e.g. Kaplan, 1975). We ask, therefore, what it would mean
to studies of organizational change if resistance was not a single, homogenous, internally
consistent disposition. What is lost by overlooking the possibility of coexistent positive
and negative attitudinal components? Piderit (2000) suggests that, in failing to consider
such a possibility, one may overlook the most common attitudinal reaction to change, the
conflicted attitude.
The existence of a conflicted mental state does appear quite plausible in regards to
organizational transformation. For instance, a person may feel reluctant to support
change based on prior negative experiences, but assess the basic concept of the actual
proposal as decent. Or, a person may find the proposal offensive based on principles,
but generally respect and sympathize with the managers who must implement it. With
these as examples, one can imagine that an overall negative tendency towards
transformation may contain within it elements of the positive. Therefore, the objective of
studying a “true” mental state may require us to consider the role of these possible
underlying conflicts (Rosenberg, 1968, p. 87). Moreover, the objective of obtaining
meaningful predictions from attitudes may require it. Wicker (1969) demonstrated in his
seminal meta-analysis, for instance, that failing to consider a more detailed definition of
attitude robbed attitude of its power to predict behavior beyond the disappointing
historical average of a .30 correlation.

5

The current study responds to Piderit’s call to introduce into resistance studies a
construct of attitude that permits a consideration of internal conflict. Psychology has
long studied this. Two attitude constructs, alternatively known as ambivalence and
inconsistency, capture the described phenomenon (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Thompson &
Zanna, 1995). Both refer to that sense of being torn between two opinions, those mixed
feelings which cause mental discomfort until they are resolved. We will specifically
investigate the construct of inconsistency. One can visualize the inconsistency
phenomenon with the common Likert scale (Figure 1). If an individual answers a 4 on
one question, and a 2 on a similar question, traditionally that discrepancy would be
ignored, by averaging the scores. That person would appear indistinguishable from a
person who responded with all 3s. Or, if sufficient discrepancies occurred across a
population, one would interpret such inconsistent results as a test reliability issue
(Norman, 1975). Advocates of inconsistency have demonstrated that these measurement
discrepancies actually relate to a meaningful mental construct of conflict (e.g. Liberman
& Chaiken, 1991; Rosenberg, 1960; Scott, 1968). Therefore, it is these meaningful
discrepancies that we aim to insert into an understanding of resistance.

6

Inconsistency

Strongly Moderately
opposed Opposed

Neutral

Moderately Strongly
Supportive Supportive

Figure 1: Likert Scale Representation of Inconsistency

Research Questions
In the present study we engage in three inquiries. First, we ask whether
inconsistency occurs toward organizational change. If so, how does it relate to common
organizational transformation techniques from management? This is a test of correlation.
Second, we ask if inconsistency is meaningful in this context. Does the elimination of
inconsistency serve a preliminary step towards persuading an individual? This is a test of
mediation. Third, does the presence of inconsistency change attitude’s ability to govern
behaviors in the context of organizational change? This last question requires a test of
moderation (Figure 2). From the perspective of the manager, the answers to all of these
questions will help determine if the inconsistent individual is a source of threat to the
mission, and what the manager should do, if anything, about it. This work takes the first
steps to translate scientific knowledge of inconsistency into practical lessons for
managers.

7

Model and Implications
Within the entire field of organizational behavior, only two empirical publications
have directly attacked the assumptions of a uniform concept of attitude. Schleicher et al.
(2004) applied the inconsistency of cognition and affect to reconfigure job satisfaction.
Oreg and Sverdlik (2011) recently applied ambivalence between evaluations of the
manager and evaluations of the initiative, to better understand our topic of resistance.
Innumerable possible conflicts of underlying discrete issues are imaginable, but the
current study, in introducing the concept of inconsistency for the topic of resistance, takes
an intentionally broad approach, one modeled after the study by Schleicher and
colleagues rather than by Oreg and Sverdlik. Namely, we determine the degree to which
inconsistency occurs for the issue of organizational change between well-evidenced
components of attitude, cognition and affect. This measure is known as the affectivecognitive consistency (ACC) of an attitude (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998).
An ACC construct has certain advantages for inclusion in this discussion of
resistance. As Rosenberg (1968) noted, conflict in terms of thoughts and feelings is a
convenient and parsimonious means to broadly capture numerous dynamics (Rosenberg,
1968). For example, in the case of resistance studies, an individual could have low
tolerance for change, feel anxiety about the new responsibilities, and feel skeptical about
success (all emotional), and yet also hold positive thoughts about the message and
messenger, and rationally conceive it as one’s duty to comply (all cognitive). Therefore,
an ACC model serves as a convenient starting point to synthesize individual findings
already present within resistance research, and which already naturally align themselves
8

along these recognized categories of information processing. Moreover, ACC is a great
ambassador for ushering in the discussion of conflict into resistance studies since it is
well-evidenced in inconsistency literature and rests on components that have been studied
extensively for decades throughout all of social psychology. ACC casts a wide net and, if
significant, should stimulate a more nuanced discussion of the underlying elements
capable of conflicting.
Because of the preexisting body of knowledge regarding ACC, employing it here
also allows an easy and effective integration of our findings back into the growing body
of inconsistency research. This point potentially has great ramifications for the field of
inconsistency itself. Inconsistency is still a concept resting on incomplete validation.
Inconsistency research currently can demonstrate an effect on behavior (through
moderation) but has failed in all efforts to empirically demonstrate what predicts or
causes inconsistency – a key criteria for gaining greater validity (Chaiken & Baldwin,
1981). The gravitas of this failing has, unfortunately, been underemphasized by
researchers (e.g., Schleicher et al., 2004). We recognize that the context for the present
research naturally provides important elements which may allow us to address the
weakest parts of inconsistency theory. Therefore, we take this opportunity to not just
advance resistance studies but to assist inconsistency research as well.
These dual objectives are apparent in all three of our tests. First, organizational
behavior studies traditionally investigate resistance with a different set of constructs than
what inconsistency research has thus far considered. For instance, we have available to
us, and focus on, the traditional organizational behavior construct of participation,
9

communication, structured procedure, managerial supportiveness and supervisor
supportiveness. In doing so, we break with the traditional and ineffectual correlate set
repeatedly studied in relationship to consistency. This new correlate set better maps
important contemporary attitude theories and offers a glimpse into the potential
shortcomings of previous research regarding this issue, as well as the shortcomings of the
original theory that has driven those studies. Second, this new context of organizational
transformation, marked by persuasion tactics, casts the study in terms of attitude change,
not attitude formation. This is the first opportunity to consider inconsistency in light of
attitude change, and thus in terms of process. Moreover, within models of attitude
change, this mediating (process) step remains largely untested (Petty, Haugtvedt, &
Smith, 1995). Therefore, we capitalize on the novelty of this context, and emphasize the
process of attitude formation. Third, the nature of the change environment, marked by
social pressures and professional considerations, represents a qualitatively new
environment in which to study moderation. Moderation tests have largely succeeded.
However, they have not had to measure inconsistency where social and professional
pressures exert themselves on behavior. This may prove a new challenge for a test of
moderation. The test of moderation in this context provides a forum to discuss how
inconsistency may actually function in a realistic setting.

10

3.

Participation

Communication

Structured Procedure

1.

Consistency

Inconsistency

2.
Openness to
Change (Attitude)

Support of
Change (Behavior)

Managerial Effectiveness

Supervisor Effectiveness

Figure 2: Research Models (1. Antecedents, 2. Mediation, 3. Moderation)

Our three test approach in this study squarely fills in the missing pieces in both
resistance studies and inconsistency studies. Regarding resistance, our three tests cover
the entire spectrum of attitude dynamics, from gestation to function. In doing so, the tests
help each person understand his or her part in the process of converting attitude into
meaningful action in an organizational setting. Regarding inconsistency research, the
prior failings to validate certain elements of inconsistency’s theory seems to have had a
dampening effect on the interest in inconsistency, studies of which have proffered only
meager scientific offerings in the last two decades. We concur with Eagly (1992) that
good theory should attract supporters; lack of supporters may signal poor theory. Against
this backdrop of weakly validated theory, a search for singular findings would appear
misguided. Our three-test approach, therefore, hopes to provide an injection of
adrenaline into the field. This effort directly dissociates itself from the piecemeal efforts
which numerous researchers in social psychology have begun to identify as a significant
weakness in traditional attitude studies (e.g., Eagly, 1992; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Petty
11

et al., 1995; Prislin, 1996). In the present study, therefore, we offer a robust series of
tests to boldly assert the potential of inconsistency in resistance studies, while also taking
the necessary steps to improve upon the languishing, but promising, field of
inconsistency research.

II. Literature Review
The Shortcoming of Resistance Literature
Organizational transformation may be defined as “deliberately planned change in
an organization’s formal structure, systems, processes, or product-market domain” to
achieve organizational objectives (Lines, 2005, p. 9). Such change can occur in large
leaps or small steps. The kinds of transformation that have concerned researchers range
in scope, from corporate mergers (e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1978) and leadership successions
(e.g., Sonnenfeld, 1988) to new evaluation systems and process systems (e.g., Armenakis
& Harris, 2009; Eby, Adams, Russel & Gaby, 2000). Change has at its core an objective
to adapt to circumstances, to increase competitiveness, and to ensure survival. And yet,
even those that subscribe to the culture of innovation and adaptation do not necessarily
succeed in change efforts. Numerous studies have revealed that organizational
transformation efforts more frequently fail than succeed (e.g., Burns, 2004; By, 2005;
Christensen & Bowers, 1996; Gilmore et al., 1997; Isern & Pung, 2007; Kotter, 1996;
Meaney and Pung, 2008). The trash bin of industrial history is, no doubt, littered with
organizations that knowingly heeded the adage “Adapt or Die.”

12

Broadly speaking, two approaches within organizational behavior literature have
influenced the dialogue as to why failure is so ubiquitous: a macro-perspective and a
micro-perspective. The macro-perspective portrays resistance as organizational inertia, a
problem of institutionalized routines and practices, an outcome of unsuitable
organizational structure and culture (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Hannan & Freeman, 1984;
Robertson, Roberts, & Porras, 1993). The micro perspective, on the other hand, places
the individual squarely in focus (e.g., Arendt, Landis, & Meister, 1995; Armenakis, et al.,
1993; Bovey & Hede, 2001a; New & Singer, 1983). As products of social psychology,
these latter studies aim to illuminate the “human condition” in the workplace. The
material of investigation includes the common psychological notions of attitudes, needs,
motivation, commitment, emotions, and information processing. This micro-perspective
has in recent years reasserted its value relative to the macro-perspective. With prolific
output, the micro-perspective has succeeded in revealing the inadequacy of a top-level
view of change, where success or failure has been portrayed as occurring uniformly
across the organization without attention to individual variance (Cole et al., 2006).
Having evidenced individual differences, the micro-perspective enriches the picture and
has demonstrated the value of the viewpoint that individuals act, not organizations
(Bartunek, 1984; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).
The successful modeling of and intuitiveness of that argument has unfortunate
consequences, however, for the discussion of resistance in both practitioner and academic
circles. Surveys of industry regularly reveal that managers most frequently attribute
failure directly to individual employee resistance, as opposed to the problems of
corporate institutions (e.g., Martin 1975; Maurer, 1997; Prochaska, Prochaska &
13

Levesque, 2001; Regar, Mullane, Gustafson, & DeMarie, 1994; Spiker & Lesser, 1995;
Waldersee & Griffiths, 1997). Much of the micro-perspective literature similarly
perpetuates this management-centric, pejorative perspective with little awareness of the
broader implications of such a bias (e.g. Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Kanter, Stein,
& Jick, 1992; Schaffer & Thomson, 1992). Namely, the dialogue casts management in
the role of providing good objectives and purpose, and employees in the role of providing
obstacles and problems. The concept of resistance has, to the detriment of the science,
been pared down to solely implicate the psychological state of the individual (Ford et al.,
2008). Even in works that evaluate the effectiveness of specific management actions
(Wanberg & Banas, 2000), the implication remains that management corrects for or
responds to a psychological phenomenon that is, at its core, spontaneous, dysfunctional,
and irrational.
Several conceptual works have made the argument that this dialectic is
incongruent with contemporary trends in society and that it is incomplete for, if not
philosophically detrimental to, the efforts to understand organizational transformations
(e.g., Piderit, 2000). Regarding the first accusation, the workplace has evolved in the last
two decades. Multiculturalism, a shift towards white-collar employment, and
improvements to social awareness and tolerance have made it possible to emphasize the
value of inclusion and diversity. Employers are more willing to entertain the possibility
that employees can contribute positively to the dialogue about change (Piderit, 2000).
Therefore, the ingrained pejorative perspective of individual resistance, occurring entirely
as a product of the employee, would appear philosophically disconnected from these
trends. Some have argued that, given the power of metaphor, Lewin’s 1952
14

nomenclature of “resistance” should be altogether retired (Dent and Goldberg, 1999; Ford
et al., 2008;). At the very least, undoing the negative impression left by decades of
research requires an attentiveness to the reified biases that inform and resonate through
our models and discussion.
The most recent publications, in the spirit of this criticism, have held one or both
of the following objectives. First, some publications have sought to restore the balance
of responsibilities among all participants (e.g. Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007; Van Dam,
Oreg, & Schyns, 2008). That is to say, they have reinterpreted the social arena where
change takes place. Second, some publications have attempted to recharacterize the state
of mind or mental processes in ways that deflect the accusation of a quick, final, absolute,
and inevitable negativity (e.g., Oreg &Sverdlik, 2011). These studies reinterpret the
mental arena in which so many prior psychological studies have laid out their arguments.
Three fields of study, in particular, may contribute to changing the discussion
about resistance. First, process models for many years have attempted to codify “stages”
of reactions to change (e.g., Armenakis et al., 1993). In doing so, they illuminate the
needs of the employee, and therein imply a mandate for managers to meet those needs.
Moreover, they have effectively incorporated the variable of time, which contradicts the
notion of simple spontaneous responses. However, criticism of process models has
pointed out that this approach downplays individual differences, and reifies management
as merely a tool bearer in the act of persuasion (Ford et al., 2005). To date, the insights
granted by these endeavors have not made gross modifications to the negative
representation of employees. Second, studies of managers-employee relationships have
discussed issues of faith, trust, social contracts, and justice to give stock to the unspoken
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social constructs of culture that can interfere with change (e.g., Lines, Selart, Espedal, &
Johansen, 2005; Stanley, Meyer, & Topolnytsky, 2005; Van Dam et al., 2008;). Such
research invigorates the discussion of employee differences and perceptions, and
heightens the discussion of manager responsibility in constructing a climate for change.
However, employees still remain the source of resistance in these models. This approach
represents a middle ground in the battle to modify the nature of resistance. Third,
sensemaking has more emphatically established a neutral playing field (e.g., George &
Jones, 2001; Stansaker & Falkenberg, 2007;). In sensemaking, employees and managers,
alike, construct the arena for change. Both parties must interpret change, individual
responsibilities, and the actions of the other. Ambiguity reigns in this interpretive arena,
where employers provide information and impressions that employees must unpack;
simultaneously employees give behavioral signs that employees must interpret as either
support or resistance. In a balletic fashion, each adjusts and changes, building
momentum to either success or failure. This avenue most aggressively reconstructs the
meaning of resistance, disassociating it from individual owners. Going forward, each of
these, in the right hands, can begin to correct the pejorative image of resistance as a
simple, spontaneous, irrational, and employee-centric event.
However, much of this literature largely relies on abstract representations of
mind, situation, and role that do not translate well into practical knowledge for
practitioners. In lieu of this approach, an additional, more tenable argument has
resonance on this issue. Several publications have implemented or called for the
employment of the more inclusive construct of attitude typically employed in the field of
social psychology, but largely absent in resistance studies (e.g., Lines, 2005). A
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multidimensional concept of attitude, consisting of cognitive, affective and intentional
mental processes, has served as the mainstay of social psychology. It has proven adept at
modeling perception, bias, and prejudice as well as explaining how these mental
tendencies occur relative to prior experiences, work environment, and social forces.
A specific aspect of a multidimensional attitude appears promising to reframing
the nature of resistance. Namely, a multidimensional model of attitudes permits the
identification of disconnections between the dimensions. These disconnections represent
internal attitudinal conflict regarding an issue (Rosenberg, 1968; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock,
1986). Within social psychology, these disconnections have revealed that overall
evaluations of an issue may contain not just negative evaluations, but also simultaneously
positive evaluations (e.g., Lavine, Thomsen, & Zanna, 1998; Rosenberg, 1968). Such a
possible mixed attitudinal framework has implications for the nature of resistance.
Specifically, the common portrayal of resistance as uniformly negative, distrustful,
defensive, or willful would lack credence. Moreover, from a sensemaking perspective,
since attitude governs behavior, the potential for conflicted attitude puts into question
whether employees could even produce behavioral signals that managers would correctly
interpret as resistance. Perhaps more than the other efforts today, the idea of conflicted
attitude may most directly, and with the least amount of reliance of philosophical
abstraction, undermine the common alibis proffered at employee expense. Namely,
attitudes contain dimensions beyond positive and negative; therefore, the diverse
behaviors that ensue reflect a diversity of thinking that goes beyond positive and
negative. Against such a backdrop, resistance may be an over-referenced illusion; failure
may be the result of other, unrecognized forces, including managers’ over-eagerness to
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codify behaviors as negative. Given the demonstrated potentiality of mixed attitude
structures within social psychology, we test this construct in the context of organizational
transformation.

Model Proposal
In the current study we introduce a construct that has previously not been
employed in resistance studies: affective-cognitive consistency (ACC). Inconsistency,
specifically between cognition and emotion, has a long history within social psychology.
Alongside ambivalence, it constitutes the common available means of seeking out
conflicted positions about issues (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). For the study of resistance, it
is a logical form to employ. Resistance studies have generally fallen along patterns that
one can categorize as studies of cognition and studies of affect. However, while the
interplay of cognition and affect has broad theoretical and empirical support through
social psychology (e.g. Eagly & Himmelfarb, 1978; Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1994;
Edwards, 1990; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972; Katz, 1960; Zajonc & Markus, 1982), it remains
sadly uninvestigated by resistance studies, which have built the science along segregated
findings, and employed attitude as a singular rather than multifaceted construct (Piderit,
2000).
Resistance literature has produced many insights that fall into the discrete
categories of cognition and affect. Oreg, for instance, discusses several key findings of
the affect-based literature (2003). Individuals may resist through a feeling of loss of
control. They may hold sway over different levels of emotional resilience to deal with
the stressors. Individuals may show preference for low levels of stimulation and novelty.
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Alone, these studies provide a sympathetic picture for the employee. However, they still
characterize resistance as a product of employee frailty. Moreover, they only portray
resistance as an affective event.
Other studies have focused on the cognitive task of accepting change, and have
uncovered a clear set of rational needs for accepting change. These approaches largely
rely on a history of information-processing models of attitude change, which espouse that
effective persuasion requires individuals to comprehend and find logical support within a
message. (e.g., Hovland et al., 1953; McGuire, 1969). Armenakis and Harris (2009)
provide baseline requirements in one such influential process model. An individual must
understand the necessity of change, and the appropriateness of the methods. The
individual must see the potential for success, witness the commitment from leadership,
and grasp the personal relevance. Lastly, the individual must see change as something
other than a spurious fad. In other works, Armenakis also has discussed to need for
congruence with personal values (Armenakis et al., 1993). Numerous process models of
resistence shed light on the complex cognitive requirements of accepting change (e.g.,
Armenakis & Bedain, 1999; Isabella, 1990; Judson, 1991; Kotter, 1995; Lowstedt, 1993).
However, they too miss a part of the picture.
While the literature clearly does not lack for explanations of resistance, they
comprise an eclectic and disparate body of knowledge that suffers accordingly (Erwin &
Garmin; Piderit, 2000). The weakness of an eclecticism becomes clear through a
notional example. Two separate studies, an emotion study of anxiety, and a cognitive
study about rational dialogue, could fail to contemplate how anxiety interferes with the
attention to rational dialogue, or how rationality might suppress inherent anxiety. We
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propose that if such studies were placed side by side in random order, one could develop
a rather extensive and plausible list of conflicts between latent cognitive processes and
latent affective processes.
Extant empirical literature within resistance studies would suggest conflict may be
a widespread phenomenon. First, it has been shown that even the most sound corporate
objective sometimes lack consonance with the honest interests and well-intended values
of the individuals who comprise the organization (e.g. Zaltman & Duncan, 1977; Zander,
1950). Therefore, one should imagine that an employee might see the commitment from
management and yet not realize the necessity of change (e.g., Oreg & Sverdlik, 2011).
Or an employee might understand the purpose, yet feel debilitating anxiety about change.
An employee might also experience conflict between short-term emotional needs and
tenable long-term values. As a second empirical example, it has been shown that certain
resistance behaviors may rest upon positive motivations, serving a well-intended, ethical
role of questioning dubious policy (e.g. Graham, 1984; Knowles & Linn, 2004b;
Modigliani & Rochat, 1995). This case not only suggests coexisting positive and
negative forces at play in resistant behaviors, but truly brings attention to the nature of
resistance. Should such well-intended behaviors be codified as resting upon negative
mental processes?
We propose affective-cognitive consistency as a means to address this
conceptually plausible phenomenon. Despite the inherent credibility of the notion of
internal conflict, resistance research has not directly sought answers for the questions of
how conflict functions and under what conditions it occurs. At the time of Piderit’s
conceptual work, no literature had sought to represent and operationalize resistance in
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this manner. Since then, a few important voices have reiterated her argument (e.g., Lines,
2005). Two qualitative reports have specifically reflected on conflicting evaluations
(Larson & Tompkins, 2005; Randall & Proctor, 2008). One empirical study has just
recently been published employing a different construct than ours, namely ambivalence
(Oreg & Sverdlik, 2011). Moreover, the issue appears to have gained some general
resonance. Piderit’s proposition has been cited numerous times (Oreg, 2003; Stanley et
al., 2005:). Illusions to coexisting conflicted evaluations have occurred (e.g., Knowles &
Linn, 2004a), and have been treated as a self-evident occurrence in the portfolio of
possible mental constructs (e.g., Ford et al., 2008). Even outside of academia, the notion
of inconsistency has some traction. For instance, a recent Pew Research report published
parallel charts of the perceived positive and negative qualities of life in the military
(Taylor et al., 2011). As a last example, in a qualitative study of program managers,
respondents blamed ambivalent senior management as a problem (Ewusi-Mensah &
Przasnyski, 1994). Internal conflict appears an accessible and relevant issue, but one that
has little empirical support.
In proposing a model of affective-cognitive consistency, we have three goals
relative to the field of organizational transformation. First, for an empirical contribution,
we wish to determine if and how inconsistent attitudes form during organizational
transformation, and how such attitudes function. Current studies have missed the
opportunity to develop understanding of what may be the most common mental state
regarding organizational transformation, the conflicted reaction (Piderit, 2000). Second,
we want the study to reflect the overarching value of a multidimensional form of attitude,
as a way to transform disparate mental functions into units of equivalent and thus
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comparable form. Third, as a contribution to theory, we wish for these findings to
stimulate the ongoing dialogue regarding the nature of resistance, and to provide concepts
for adaptation into other organizational transformation studies. For instance, process
models have already elucidated the dynamic environment where perception and
interpretation may shift in temporal stages (Isabella, 1990). We propose, by way of
example, that the classic sequential steps such as unfreezing-moving-refreezing model
(Lewin, 1947), could play out individually as moving-moving-moving. Some individuals
may, in other words, display inconsistency throughout the time frame set aside for
transformation. Or, individuals may experience inconsistency during a particular step in
a process model (i.e., inconsistency-moving-freezing). Providing concrete evidence of
the role of conflicting attitudes should set the stage for these broader investigations.
This study represents a departure from present resistance studies. At the same
time, the study also represents a dramatic change from preceding inconsistency studies.
Previous studies have only investigated inconsistency in a relatively decontextualized
format suitable for a study of attitude formation. The present study considers it in regard
to attitude change (during persuasion), and in a very specific social context, the
workplace. These novelties have important implications. First, these modifications of
context guide us to consider social constructs relative to inconsistency that have
previously not been tested. Second, these modifications requires us to truly question
whether previous findings of moderation truly are relevant for this context. Third, these
modifications test the limits of inconsistency theory (and we must acknowledge that in
our study). Current theory provides only partial guidance for the current endeavor. We
must look across a wide spectrum of related research for additional guidance. In studying
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inconsistency with these thoughts in mind, our study begins an important synthesis of
research and ideas which hinders inconsistency today, and which has hindered related
constructs in the past (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Eagly has warned that “if investigators
look only to the most obvious research, not only do they miss many potentially useful
theoretical ideas, but also they allow their theories to be seriously limited by constraints
of their research paradigms, which often allow only certain processes to be manifest
(1992).” The challenge of incorporating inconsistency into a context-rich environment
both threatens current inconsistency theory and forces a much-belated evolution upon it.
In the rest of this chapter we focus on the theory and evidence for
multidimensional attitudes and inconsistent attitudes. The following review substantiates
the strength of the argument for why inconsistency should play a role in organizational
transformation. We pose three questions. First, how do inconsistent attitudes emerge or
are become allayed in the context of organizational change? The argument for our
antecedent set requires a synthesis of material that has not occurred in inconsistency
studies yet, and comprises the bulk of our review. Second, is overcoming inconsistency
an important step in changing attitudes towards an initiative? For this test of mediation
we must return to the inception of the idea of inconsistency and towards theories from
persuasion literature. Third, does inconsistency influence behavior? The test for
moderation has substantial empirical evidence, but we reveal why our current context
challenges the ability to generalize from that prior research.
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Attitude
Inconsistency describes an attribute of attitude. Attitude has served as the most
prominent construct in social psychology for many decades, and may very well constitute
the “primary building stone” of the science (Allport, 1954, p. 45). In lay terms, the
psychological construct of attitudes attempts to speak to the functions of the mind that
infuse our passions and hates, attractions and repulsions, likes and dislikes (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1998). Attitudes manifest themselves in a biasing of our evaluations,
perceptions, and relationships to our world. Attitudes rest on prior experience (Allport,
1935), and create a readiness to act toward an issue (Kassajian, & Kassajian, 1979).
Eagly and Chaiken provide a well-regarded inclusive and contemporary definition stating
that attitude is a latent “psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a
particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor (2007, p. 598).”
Attitude plays an indispensible part in socio-psychology due to three factors: the
inherent plausibility of the role of attitude to govern behavior, the centrality of attitudes
in the human condition, and unbounded prospects of attitude. First, the alluring premise
of attitudes is that individuals demonstrate consistency between inner states of mind and
outward behavior (Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Heider, 1946). This model is seductive
for its simplicity: An inner state of mind and the overt behavior display consonance. If
one can Figure out how to measure attitude, one can better predict behavior. Second, the
model also seems appealingly molar in the human experience. Attitude, likely a
psychological result of many experiences, firmly serves in a useful, central mediation
role, explaining a myriad of influences on behavior (Petty & Wegener, 1998). The
central role of attitudes can be visualized in one of the many heuristics of attitudes, as in
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Figure 3. Third, the model is also unbounded. Attitudes may predict broad, enduring
categories of behavior (environmentalism, political affiliation, prejudicial actions), or
narrower, one-time behaviors (voting, shopping, name choice). In this way, the
relationship between attitude and behavior might embrace all of social and personal
existence (Petty & Wegener, 1998). For example, the large scale social phenomenon
that amount to our common history (shifts in racism and gender roles) likely occur due to
attitudes (Krosnick & Petty, 1995).
Independent
Variables
Individual
Attributes

Experience

Mediating
Processes

Outcome

Attitude
Affective
Process

Cognitive
Process

Behavior

The Issue
Behavioral
Process

Social/Enviro
Context

Figure 3: General Model of Attitude-Behavior Relationship (modified from Petty &
Wegener, 1998)

Inconsistency summons the same notion which has intrigued philosophers for
millennia: being “mixed” or “torn” about an issue (Thompson & Zanna, 1995; Williams
& Aaker, 2002). Numerous descriptors occur throughout the psychological literature to
attempt to describe the concept: ambivalence (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Kaplan, 1972),
instability (Rosenberg, 1960), duality (Williams & Aaker, 2002), discrepancy (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1998; Priester & Petty, 2001), intrapersonal conflict (Priester & Petty, 2001),
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incongruency (Fazio and Zanna, 1978), variability (Sparks, Hedderly, & Shepherd,
1992), conflicted utility (Sparks, Harris, & Lockwood, 2004), mixed feelings (Brown,
1965), and conflicted motivation (Conner, Sparks, Povey, James, Shepherd, & Armitage,
2001). Each term has its own nuanced implications, but each study has converged on one
of two models: ambivalence or inconsistency. The primary purpose of both is to
reconfigure attitude to account for mental conflict that interferes with the governing role
of attitude. Comparisons to independent measures have substantiated that the measure of
inconsistency does, indeed, relate to conflicted values at work (e.g., Liberman &
Chaiken, 1991; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock, 1986).

Inconsistency
The concept of inconsistency relies largely on a specific capacity of attitudes.
Namely, attitudes encompass a broad array of mental activity, as theorized and
evidenced through many mediating studies (Ajzen, 2001). The mediating role of attitude
permits one to imagine attitude as a warehouse, a “conceptual arena” (Abelson &
Rosenberg, 1958, p. 2), or a “cognitorium” (Rosenberg, 1968, p. 81). Inconsistency
theory specifically utilizes three tenants of attitude related to its apparent breadth. First,
attitudes form out of multiple evaluations and multiple types of information processing.
Second, attitudes normally tend to demonstrate consistency across these multiple types of
information processing. Third, attitudes are not stable or fixed mental constructs (Eagly
& Chaiken, 2007). Each of these contribute to the theory and modeling of inconsistency.
Namely, in this space, poor arrangements of material may occur. Rosenberg conceived
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of the concept of inconsistency as a way to represent the transient process of attitudinal
reorganization in light of new information.
The first important tenant of attitudes is that they encompass multiple evaluations.
Our diverse and myriad experiences inform our attitudes. For example, a mention of
communism may conjure up a American political discourse, images of Stalinism,
memories of a grandfather who flew in the Berlin Airlift, and also personal experiences
with welfare or state medicine. Rosenberg (1968) asked his audience to visualize a space
filled with values that are tied together, such that moving one cannot but disturb another.
Singer (1968) described this potential resonance of sub-factors as their “pervasiveness”
(p. 73). Singer further characterized pervasiveness as “bothersome" (p. 73), in which
wide-ranging, even unexpectedly eclectic thoughts and feelings could occur. More recent
psychological studies (e.g., Liberman & Chaiken, 1991) and emerging neuroscience (e.g.,
Conrey & Smith, 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007; Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006) have found that attitudes are indeed embedded in broad networks of
interrelated values. Attitude, perceived as singular, or as an average of sub-forces
(Anderson, 1971), contain multitudes.
A measure of affective-cognitive consistency rests on more specific evidence of
the multiplicity of attitude. Studies have identified certain building blocks of attitude.
These building blocks, or components, consist of the different psychological processes of
forming an attitude: cognitive, affective, and intentional. These three components
constitute the tripartite view of attitude, which has largely informed contemporary views
and models of attitude (Brown, 1965; Katz & Stotland, 1959; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948;
Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). The thought-based process approximates beliefs (Fishbein
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& Ajzen, 1972). Alternatively conceived, it constitutes a rationalization and comparative
analysis of an issue. The affective process describes the emotional, less reasoned
reactions to issues. Fear, anxiety, mood, arousal, and empathy come into play in this
domain (Edwards, 2002). Physiological research continues to reveal different brain
patterns of these less-than-cognitive reactions to objects (Schimmack & Crites, 2005).
Lastly, the intentional process describes a quasi-cognitive function in which one
scrutinizes an issue through the filter of personal intentions. It captures a specific
willingness to act. Decades of research have validated these categories of attitudes (e.g.,
Bagozzi, 1978; Bagozzi, 1981; Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Ostrom, 1969). Although one
may represent conflict among countless individual items, the existence of components
provides us a convenient structure in which to represent conflict (Rosenberg, 1960), and
helps us to differentiate the measure from test reliability artifacts (Schleicher et al., 2004;
Norman, 1975).
The second important tenant of attitudes is that the components tend toward
consistency, balance and redundancy. Abelson and Rosenberg (1958) point out the
similarities of the main variations of the family of “consistency” theories: affectivecognitive consistency (Rosenberg, 1960), balance theory (Heider, 1958; Newcomb,
1968), the symbolic psycho-logic approach (Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958), and the
congruity model (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). Their shared viewpoints exist as
fundamental concepts within attitude research. The theories explain that individuals seek
to resolve the discomforts of inconsistent thoughts and values. The natural steady state of
attitudes occurs when cognition and affect mirror each other in valence or favorability.
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As a postulate to this tenant, Rosenberg imagined that inconsistency might occur as a
temporal state during the process of attitude formation or change (1960;1968).
The third important tenant of attitudes is that they are not fixed in quality or
intensity. Rosenberg proposed that each new experience with an issue or object has the
potential to trigger attitudinal reassessment (1960; 1968). Although they naturally
coagulate towards a stable state, novelty combined with some unspecified degree of
personal profundity could trigger a reassessment of that stable attitudinal state. Given the
diversity of individual experiences, Rosenberg believed that for any given issue one
could identify within a population those who would find sufficient novelty and profundity
to undergo an attitudinal reassessment (1968).
Rosenberg describes several different scenarios for restructuring to occur. First,
the issue could trigger awareness of preexisting inconsistency, or flaws, in the tripartite
structure of the attitude. In this case, latent inconsistencies previously existed below a
threshold of awareness. Once aware, the individual must eventually resolve those
inconsistencies. Second, one could hold a non-attitude, or “vacuous” attitude (1968, p.
82). This would occur when an individual has not extensively considered the issue
previously. Inconsistency would manifest itself through an exploration of possible
responses, thoughts and feelings, until a structure crystallizes. As a third and final
scenario, counterattitudinal information (a persuasive argument), can lead to a
restructuring of attitude. An individual would explore the alternative position, or attitude.
The attitude becomes destabilized, “fragmented”, until thoughts and feelings can resolve
themselves and find a consistent basis. An individual may in the end reject the
counterattitudinal information and retain the original attitude, or accept the new
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information, and modify the original attitude. The entire process produces instability,
self-discovery, uncertainty, exploratory responses, and eventual compartmentalization of
any remaining conflict. The tripartite view provided Rosenberg the common, convenient
Gestalt by which to represent a state of temporary flux during the process of attitude
formation and change.

Strength: Beyond Bipolar Representation of Attitude
The malleability of attitudes does not imply that attitudes change easily.
Edwards, in reviewing the functions of attitudes for the individual, concludes that the
process of changing an attitude presents a formidable challenge (1990). Lines warns that
attitude toward organizational transformation is a critical event because attitudes, once
formed, may prove extremely difficult to modify (2005). Since organizations generally
do not have an indefinite time frame to institute change, and since multistage models
emphasize the urgencies of each stage (e.g., Kotter, 1995), the rigidity of an attitude
speaks to the basic concern for resistance studies.
Social psychology employs the terms strength to describe this aspect of an
attitude (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993; Rosenberg, 1968;). This
dimension of an attitude differs from its favorability or extremity, which the Likert scale
and other tools for attitude measurement tend to approximate (Abelson, 1995; Krosnick
& Petty, 1995; Schleicher et al., 2004). Strength research considers numerous constructs
as potentially aiding in the strength of an attitude. Consistency, intensity, salience,
accessibility, knowledge, centrality, embeddedness, complexity, importance, and vested
interest have served as prominent constructs in this field for many years (e.g., Bass &
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Rosen, 1969). Strength is a heuristic that describes an attitude as possessing two features:
endurance and force (Krosnick & Petty,1995). Endurance encompasses both the ability
to persist from day to day in and of itself, but also the ability to resist attack and
persuasion. This feature most directly relates to the idea of stability, evoked by
Rosenberg (1968). Force, on the other hand, reminds us that an intuitive notion of
strength is not just that an attitude can endure, but that the attitude matters more than a
weak one. And how does an attitude matter? It has impact. It is consequential
(Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). From this perspective, strong attitudes
should be more likely to guide behavior than weak ones (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Force
also describes the ability of an attitude to skew and bias information processing through
psychological acts often understood as schema formation and scaffolding (Pratkanis &
Greenwald, 1989). Such a feature of strength helps explain how a strong attitude affects
our perception of the world as well as imparts a resistance to counterarguments. These
forces, conceptually intertwined, explain attitude strength. As an added dimension of
attitude, strength hints at how variables such as inconsistency could change the landscape
of resistance studies.
Inconsistency research has substantiated its claims of functioning as a “strength
variable” by demonstrating that inconsistency relates to all four main strength properties.
In each case, inconsistency would weaken an attitude. First, inconsistent attitudes lack
persistence. As the foundational property of the theory, Rosenberg firmly established
with over a decade of research that consistency is the hallmark of a persistent or stable
attitude (1960; 1968). Second, inconsistency lacks resistance. Norman has shown that
inconsistent individuals conformed to a confederate’s oppositional response (1975).
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Third, inconsistency has impact on behavior. Numerous studies have focused on this
point by employing inconsistency as a moderator in the attitude-behavior relationship
(e.g. Norman, 1975; Franc 1999; Schleicher et al., 2004). Consistent attitude predict
behavior better. Fourth, inconsistency affects information processing. Several
inconsistency studies have ambitiously explored this realm (e.g., Chaiken &
Baldwin,1981; Chaiken & Yates, 1985).
The concept of strength, whether employing inconsistency or one of the many
other strength constructs, has greatly improved the study of attitudes and the fields of
research that have relied upon attitudes. Strength adds a new vector to a traditional
bipolar representation of attitude, one often measured along a Likert-type continuum.
The aspect of attitude derived from a mere continuum likely represents the favorability or
extremity of an attitude as opposed to its strength (Abelson, 1995; Fishbein & Ajzen,
1972; Schleicher et al., 2004;). Favorability and extremity has long appeared to be of
dubious value in studying attitudes (Corey, 1937; LaPiere, 1934; McNemar, 1946). An
important meta-analysis that ushered in a period of doubt in attitude research in the 1970s
revealed that attitudes measured as favorability only account for about .30 of the
explanation for behavior (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Strength variables have improved upon
those finding and, therein, have dealt with the “most perplexing problem” of attitude
favorability not meeting expectations (Bass and Rosen, 1969, p. 331). Because of the
effectiveness of strength variables, an attitude moderated by a strength variable has been
referred to as a “true” attitude (Rosenberg, 1968, p. 87), or a “genuine” attitude (Kaplan,
1975, p. 365). Others have referred to the “attitude-non attitude continuum” (e.g.,
Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1995, p. 401). This is not simply didacticism;
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both physiological and psychological research has substantiated that a bipolar (positivenegative) representation of attitude is insufficient (Cacioppo, et al., 1997). In seeking to
determine the value of simple bipolar representation, some have speculated that mere
favorability notionally suggests different attitudes which may cause different behaviors
(Abelson, 1995; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972; Thompson, Zanna & Griffen 1995). In the end,
attitude research has treated the original attitude-behavior base model as effectively dead
(Judge et al., 2001).
Despite this clear evolution of attitude modeling since the 1970s, resistance
studies have almost universally employed a single dimensional and unqualified version of
attitude. Therefore, resistance research provides practically a blank slate upon which to
write a new model of attitude. The conclusion we can draw from inconsistency studies is
that consistent attitude structures may, indeed, pose a problem for persuasion because
such attitude display the aforementioned perceived “rigidity”. Inconsistent attitudes, on
the other hand, may be easier to persuade. Other implications of the literature are that
effective persuasion should have as its goal not just attitude change, but strong,
irreversible attitude change (attitude with a stable, unwavering structure). That is to say,
a manager might need to, indeed, reach the “hearts and minds” of the employees to
engender reliable, enduring attitudinal support.

Strength Applied to Organization Transformation Behaviors
Direct empirical support does not yet exist for the claim that a manager must
obtain a strong attitudinal support from employees in order to successfully transform an
organization. Those who have called for the inclusion of a strength perspective in
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resistance studies have, however, drawn that conclusion from the findings within
attitudinal research. Namely, only an attitude that is both favorable and strong will
provide unequivocal support for an initiative (Lines, 2005). Since empirical support does
not yet exist for this conclusion, the researchers have speculated as to how known
resistance behaviors would relate to a two-vector representation of attitude. The works of
Lines (2005) and Bovey and Hede (2001a) propose similar heuristics for strength within
resistance modeling.
The four quadrant representation in Figure 4, developed by Lines, attempts to
configure typical behaviors into four different combinations of our two vectors: positivestrong, positive-weak, negative-strong, and negative-weak. The first thing to notice is
that behaviors on the left side (strong) and on the right side (weak) differ significantly in
character. One could characterize the strong behaviors as clear and obvious in terms of
their favorability. The categorization of persistence, focus, and taking charge as products
of positive attitudes requires little gamble. Likewise, categorizing sabotage and exit as
products of negative attitude would seem riskless. Strong attitudes align themselves with
unambiguous behaviors. As such, when dealing with strong attitude, a manager’s task of
assessing employee attitudes could be quite accurate.
Alternatively, the right side of the chart (weak attitudes) generates behaviors that
lack clear definition, and that appear full of tension and ambiguity. One can see that
weak attitudes might interfere with an employee’s ability to take impactful action. Each
attitude contains an inner contradiction, such as going along with the initiative yet
remaining hesitant, or going through the motions but wrestling with the perceived
counterargument. Employees may even feign support, employing differing degrees of
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deception (Bercovitz, & Feldman, 2008; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). The end
state is unclear from these behaviors. One would draw such a conclusion from the
findings of inconsistency in particular. Namely, inconsistent attitudes may force an
employee to explore various actions or positions en route to crystallizing a true and
strong attitude (Rosenberg, 1968). The true attitude-behavior relationship should appear
weak during any given moment where attitudes are weak. Moreover, if an employee
produces less obvious or erratic behaviors, a manager would likely attend less accurately
to cues. That manager would thusly be apt to misattribute a supportiveness score to that
employee.
One of the conclusions a manager should draw from this chart, therefore, is that
weak attitudes might produce behaviors full of ambiguity and uncertainty that will
complicate the responsibility of leadership. First, compliance, lip service, and
organizational silence hardly seem like a foundation upon which an organization may
build a successful transformation. Moreover, they contain an element of subterfuge and
duplicity. In some respects, strong negative attitudes might produce a better scenario,
since then management might become more aware of the issue. If left unnoticed, such
behaviors could drain the momentum of a change initiative. Second, few behaviors on
this chart would fully support a successful transformation. Only those in the positivestrong quadrant would appear to unequivocally add value to the organization. As a
heuristic, this chart permits a clear picture of the challenging psychological landscape
influencing organization transformation. An initiative may need to trigger not just a
favorable reaction, but also a strong reaction. For the present study, that would imply

35

that an initiative would need to produce both positive thoughts and positive feelings
about the issue of change.
Strong

Weak

Organizational citizenship
Taking charge
Positive Pro-change behavior
Persistence
Focus
Effort

Compliance
Lip Service
Organizational silence

Exit
Resistence
Negative Sabotage
Whistle Blowing
Cynicism
Disengagement

Compliance
Foot-dragging
Organizational silence

Figure 4: Relationship between Valence and Strength (Lines, 2005)

A comparison of the left and right side of the chart describes the case of
moderation, where a base relationship between attitude and behavior changes when a
strength construct is considered. Although Lines did not formulate this heuristic with
inconsistency directly in mind (but rather all strength constructs), one can see how
inconsistency may prove to be an ideal construct to begin the empirical test of this
heuristic. Each of the behaviors on the right of the chart seem to directly speak to a realm
where inner tension and contradictions reign. Going forward, if consistency helps
contribute to strength, what can the manager do to foster consistency and to push
attitudes toward the left side of the chart?

This is a test of antecedents.
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Antecedents: A New Methodology
In his conceptual works, Rosenberg set in motion the basic notions of what would
trigger inconsistency. Contact with the attitudinal object, even as simple as a survey
question, could trigger these processes (Rosenberg, 1968). However, the transformative
value of the stimulus would ultimately depend on the individual’s prior familiarity with,
experience with, and knowledge of the issue. Higher levels of each of these should
theoretically permit a well-structured attitude to already exist. Lower levels of these
would enable a person to be more susceptible to persuasion and attitude change.
Therefore, Rosenberg had proposed a set of individual latent constructs (measurement of
mental qualities) as predictors of inconsistency.
While the individual arrives with certain latent constructs, the object (the issue)
also comes with a certain capacity to interact with those constructs. Rosenberg dedicated
considerable conceptual effort to reflect on this second potential set of antecedents, the
object attributes. In synthesizing the many references provided by Rosenberg in his
seminal works (1960;1968), the attributes of an objects most suited to triggering
inconsistency are those of novelty, profundity, and breadth. Since certain qualities of the
object may matter, inconsistency can be referred to as domain specific, not as a
dispositional trait of the individual (Rosenberg, 1968). That is to say, every object has a
differential capacity to trigger inconsistency. Therefore, two different antecedent sets
exist for us to explore: individual latent constructs, and object attributes.
While Rosenberg offers up many potential lines of research, the direct empirical
support for his premises remains thin. Direct studies of antecedents have been rare in
inconsistency studies. Moreover, the studies that have occurred have focused exclusively
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on the individual qualities such as familiarity, experience, and knowledge of the issue.
Worse yet, contrary to theory, those studies have failed to produce meaningful empirical
results. As for object attributes, advocates of inconsistency have not attempted to
validate those antecedents, which is not entirely surprising since Rosenberg’s depiction of
those object attributes is rather serpentine. However, studies from outside of
inconsistency research would appear to lend to support for his thinking.
The current study tests neither antecedent set directly, but rather takes a third
approach which indirectly subsumes both lines of inquiry. We focus on the role of
context and situation. Rosenberg emphasized that inconsistency is a situational
phenomenon, not dispositional (1968). The inclusion of a context or situation perspective
has several important implications, based on more contemporary environmental research.
First, certain contextual attributes should aid in engaging and making relevant any given
knowledge and experience during the interaction with the object. Second, certain
contextual attributes should reduce the appearance of novelty, profundity, and breadth.
The current study emphasizes the critical role of perception and how context influences
perception. For instance, attitudinal objects don’t actually contain such characteristics
like a physical object. An object, by itself, is not novel, profound or broad. It is the
individual’s perception of the object’s novelty, profundity, and breath that should matter
in the formation of inconsistency. Therefore, to talk of the attributes of an object is
merely to describe the potentiality, or likelihood, that the object will be perceived as such.
Similarly, latent individual constructs (like knowledge) do not necessarily work
spontaneously, or with immediate accessibility (Fazio, 1987) when the individual makes
contact with an object, but rather become relevant based on the contextual situation.
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Therefore, the current study summons the role of perception and context to differentially
produce inconsistency.
Figure 5 represents our own depiction of the convergence of influences in attitude
formation. The individual and the object meet in a given context. That context may
provide the correct material to generate consistent attitude formation, or it may not. At
the center of the Figure lies the attitude, forming within the social context.
Social Context
Individual Latent
Constructs

Attitude

Objective Attributes

Figure 5: Confluence of Object Attributes and Latent Constructs

While previous antecedent research has considered only the dynamics from the
left, our work looks at how an issue with the likely capacity to trigger inconsistency is
differently delivered and differentially perceived. As Rosenberg had intuited, certain
techniques of message delivery should be able to augment or diminish the capacity of the
issue to trigger inconsistency (1968). We inject these situational and contextual variables
into the discussion, applying for the first time a more comprehensive test of Rosenberg’s
theory. Contextual constructs may provide the missing element that may explain where
prior studies have failed.

Antecedents: Individual Triggers of Inconsistency
Thus far, all studies have focused exclusively on latent psychological constructs
of the individual. Consistent with a selective set of Rosenberg’s remarks, the ones that
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have appealed most to researchers are knowledge, direct experience, and vested interest.
Although each represents half of the act of constructing reality, as we depicted in Figure
5, each has regularly failed to explain any of the influences on inconsistency. We can
conclude from the overview of the research in Table 1 that the overall empirical evidence
for inconsistency’s antecedents is sketchy. Inconsistency appears to neither convincingly
nor regularly relate to the plausible individual predictors of it. And this is unsettling.
Quite simply, if inconsistency captures a malformation of an attitude, some of these
“formation-inducing” variables should negatively correlate to it. Therefore, one must
either question the validity of the construct (which Chaiken & Baldwin hesitantly do), or
question the methodology, theoretical underpinning, and efforts of the previous tests
(which we will do). Alternatively, one may speculate that the emphasis on individual
latent constructs in conjunction with the failure to consider the role of object attributes
represents a fundamental flaw in the approach of these studies. Whatever may be the
case, until significant findings resting on sound theoretical foundations and solid
methodology occurs, an important aspect of the discussion of inconsistency rests solely
on theory and speculation.
This assessment of the literature makes some broad statements of the overall
picture of predictors. However, Table 1 also beckons us to consider the few significant
findings as well. In the present review, however, we will not address in detail the few
significant findings in detail. Several reasons lead us to skip that task. First, none of the
individual significant correlations have been replicated with confidence. Second, the
authors of these studies have not definitively identified the findings in such a way as to be
sure the signs printed in this chart are correct. Because a larger score of a “consistency”
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operationalization actually signifies less consistency, terse reports and charts permit
certain ambiguities. We have attempted to correct for or interpret the results in a logical
way, sometimes changing the published sign of the relationship where ambiguities could
not be resolved (e.g. Franc, 1999; Krosnick et al., 1993). Third, the intriguing results by
Prislin were not identifiable as significant or not, and appear on the cusp of correlation
size that may likely not be significant (with the exception of extremity). Moreover, these
represent the best results of several tests Prislin ran, the others clearly not proving
significant. Fourth, if methodology is to blame (which we contend and will explain),
then ruminating about the importance of any particular finding is moot.
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Table 1: Correlation Results to Inconsistency
Authors (date)
Rosenberg (1960, 1968)
Norman (1975)

Attitudinal Object
various
participation in research

Correlation to Inconsistency
stability
stability
certainty
importance
Fazio & Zanna (1977)
participation in research
certainty
direct experience
Chaiken & Baldwin (1981) environmentalism
extremity
amount of prior thinking
personal importance
social desirability tendency
Krosnick et al (1993)
capital punishment
knowledge
abortion*
intensity
defense spending*
importance
certainty
(* subject with significant
extremity
finding; directiion uncertain) direct experience
latitude of rejection
Prislin (1996)
affirmative action**
affective extremity
legalized abortion
evaluative extremity
euthanasia
amount of experience
pizza
certainty
importance
(**subject with significant
finding)

Maio, Bell,
& Esses (1996)

foreigners/immigration

Franc (1999)

legalized abortion***
(direction uncertain)

Hodson, Maio,
& Esses (2001)

social welfare

Significance? Size Operation
yes
Rosenberg
yes
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Norman
no
Norman
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
partial, r =-.38, -.29, 0 Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
no
Rosenberg
not stated, -.16, -.03 Rosenberg
likely, -.33, -.13
Rosenberg
not stated, -.16, -.10 Rosenberg
not stated, -.18, -.12 Rosenberg
not stated, -.19, -.18 Rosenberg

vested interest
not stated, -.16, -.19
amount of previous thinking
not stated, -.16, -.10
self-reported knowledge
not stated, -.10, -.09
working knowledge
no
accessibility
no
latitude of rejection
no
ambivalence
no
number of sterotypes
no
number of symbolic beliefs
no
number of emotions
no
favorability
no
extremity
no
certainty
no
importance
no
latitude of rejection
yes, r = -.15
ambivalence
yes r= .24 , -.29
extremity
no
embeddness
no
commitment (certainty & import partial, r= -.23, -.31, 0
latitude of rejection
no

Rosenberg
Rosenberg
Rosenberg
Rosenberg
Rosenberg
Rosenberg
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman
Norman

Given the preponderance of non-significant findings, one may be apt to take the
same approach toward them as well – to not delve into specifics. However, the
contradictory and null findings for the relationship to ambivalence do require some
attention since several writers have identified ambivalence as a variant of inconsistency
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(e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). In truth, the positive correlation to ambivalence, found by
Hodson, Maio, & Esses (2001), is both logical and predicted (e.g., Thompson et al.,
1995). However, the additional negative correlation (within the same study!) as well as
the null finding by Maio, Bell, & Esses (1996) quickly put into doubt the value of the
sole positive correlation. We offer several practical mathematical explanations which the
authors of these studies have failed to recognize. First, ambivalence generally employs a
nonlinear math, while inconsistency applies a linear math (Breckler, 1984). Second, each
employs vastly different survey tools. Ambivalence employs a semantic differential scale
(Green & Goldfried, 1965; Kaplan, 1975). Such scales tend to impose conflict onto an
attitude regardless of whether one is felt or perceived, compartmentalized or not
(Breckler, 1994; McGregor, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 1995; Priester, Petty, & Parks,
2007). Inconsistency, on the other hand, often employs a traditional Likert question
format, which, depending on the nature of the questions, has a differential ability to tease
out fine differences. Third, theory from Rosenberg would suggest that data from the
lower range of the measure may be fallacious. As such, both tools contain sufficient
peculiarity that they do not lend themselves to comparative analysis.
This comparison of the constructs has implications for future studies as well as
our study. Future studies will need to determine how these two constructs conceptually
differ, and whether they serve science best by remaining distinct constructs or by
changing their operationalizations to converge upon a common understanding of the
phenomenon. Our study must recognize that the operationalization of inconsistency may
still require modifications, based on evolving research findings from ambivalence (e.g,
Priester et al., 2007). Though we do not engage in that endeavor in this paper, we realize
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that our tool may still only provide approximations of our intended construct. This is a
frank admission of a science still establishing itself. The tool itself may require a future
review to fine tune it for its intended use. That being said, certain clear methodological
improvements can still be made in the meantime. Our study identifies and corrects for
those.

Methodological Limitations of Prior Tests of Correlation
Two methodological limitations put into doubt the value and meaning of both the
significant and non-significant findings to date. Only the studies by Fazio and Zanna
(1977) and the study by Franc (1999) are immune from the potential confounding
influences of these methodological limitations. First, the majority of research has
occurred in broad strength studies with alternative motives. These alternative motives
may have prevented more informed analysis. Second, these studies suffer from
mathematical peculiarities associated with Rosenberg’s operationalization. Only the
studies since 1996 have dissociated themselves clearly from what we feel is an antiquated
operationalization. However, these improved studies have yet to explore the wide array
of possible antecedents, and still stuffer from the first limitation (the alternative motive).
As a first critique, much of the above research has not occurred in order to
directly investigate the nuances of inconsistency. Instead these studies have occurred as
part of a broad analysis of strength variables. In a rather contentious debate, the studies
have focused on factor analysis. Some have hoped for factor loadings (e.g., Abelson,
1988; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996; Prislin,1996), while others have sought to dispel such a
concept (Krosnick et al., 1993). In both cases the factor loadings of numerous constructs
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have held these researchers’ focus. The impetus behind these efforts was the recognition
that numerous strength variables studies have occurred in isolation, and that the
possibility of multicolinearity, conceptual overlapping, and redundancy had not been
investigated (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993; Krosnick & Petty,
1995; Prislin, 1996). Parsimony theories emerged to recommend subsuming multiple
constructs. In this context, the specific null findings for inconsistency have not alerted
the researchers to validity issues, as it should to one attending specifically to
inconsistency.
Taken out of context, these factor analysis studies provide great support for the
unique contribution of inconsistency to attitude formation. The various inconsistency
types (affective-cognitive, affective-evaluative, cognitive-evaluative) have loaded
together, but entirely separate from the other strength constructs. Drawing a conclusion
of inconsistency’s unique value (as they have done), however, remains at odds with what
consistency research needs first and foremost at this time. Inconsistency needs additional
evidence of validity. Failing to load with other constructs may simply provide evidence
that inconsistency is an invalid subset of constructs amidst a sea of valid ones. Moreover,
they likely load with each other simply due to the fact that they are all constructed from
the same parts of the same data, thusly displaying built-in multicolinearity. Therefore,
we feel that this literature has little capacity to shed any light on the actual relational or
validity status of inconsistency. These studies’ silence regarding illogical findings
suggests that the researchers conducted an incomplete investigation as it pertains to
inconsistency. We must conclude that more thoughtful investigation may have either led
to modifications of their methods or to insight of methodological deficiencies.
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As a second critique, the best explanation for the null findings relates the
operationalization of the variable. Rosenberg’s measure of inconsistency is measured in
a peculiar way. The scores on the Affective attitude measure are summed. The
individuals are ranked based on this sum. The same is done for the Cognitive attitude
measure. ACC is than arrived at by taking the Absolute Value of one rank minus the
other. The idea is that if a person is 10th highest on the Affective measure, to be
consistent, that person should be 10th highest on the Cognitive measure. Anything other
than that represents inconsistency.
Of all conceivable operationalizations, this seems most likely to generate peculiar
numerical results. Consider the problem from the perspective of the most egregious
scenario. One can imagine situations where an entirely consistent person (40 out of 50 on
one scale, and a 40 out of 50 on the other) can be outranked by his more of his colleagues
on one measure than on another. That person then ends up with an inconsistency score,
when in fact the individual was entirely consistent. Such a measure would be outright
fallacious. The erratic results possible throughout the continuum speak of the tools’
unreliability.
We argue that Rosenberg’s math is ultimately a foil which must be discarded.
Repeatedly, researchers have deferred to it with no examination, calling it the traditional
method (e.g. Chaiken et al., 1995; Schleicher et al., 2004;). Zhou, Wang, Dovidio, and
Yu (2009) even refers to it as the “classical” form (p. 786). However, this
operationalization suffers fourfold. First, it can fabricate inconsistency scores where no
inconsistency occurs. Second, and related, it irregularly transforms differences among
individuals. Individuals with the same dissimilarity between components can end up
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with different inconsistency scores, or vice versa. Third, the tool compounds random
error, where one’s inconsistency measure is a result of both one’s own random error as
well as someone else’s (Judd & Krosnick, 1989). This is a statistical nightmare that none
have addressed. Fourth, the tool implies that one’s mental inconsistency score should
reflect one’s consistency relative to others. No theory has espoused this. This last point
is problematic for studies. If relational consistency were of importance, than the tool
should not be used across different work places or climates, but only among individuals
who share the same relational climate. Schleicher’s choice to use Rosenberg’s
operationalization among different firehouses is, therefore, quite dubious. Together,
these points reveal the statistic, methodological, and theoretical problems with using
Rosenberg’s operationalization. While the tool may have served well enough to
categorize individuals into two cohorts (high/low), it does not have the validity for direct
relational analysis with other variables (nor for moderated regression analysis, for that
matter). The numerical outputs are broad and rough, rather than precisely meaningful in
and of themselves. His scores function as a mere categorization tool; and this is how he
employed it – to create high and low cohorts. It is not a differentiation tool necessary for
relational analysis.
For relational analysis one must turn to a different operationalization. Norman
tested an alternative version to account for some of the erratic results that he theorized
would occur (1975). It appears to have attracted attention with its greater face validity
(e.g. Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Franc, 1999;). It has been employed by two broad studies of
the strength variables (Hodson et al., 2001; Maio et al., 1996). Therefore, a fix for
Rosenberg’s operationalizaion already exists for the current and future studies.
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Guidance for a New Antecedent Set: The Elaboration-Likelihood Model
The previous discussion identified flaws in prior studies related to the math
employed as well as to the effort of analysis (a product of ulterior motives or biases of the
research). These place in doubt the value of any of the discrete findings. However, a
much more important flaw may have occurred in the previous test designs. That flaw
may relate to the basic theory of inconsistency. Namely, the choice of antecedents and
the choice of how to include them in the models may have been misguided. First, the
tests have focused exclusively on individual latent constructs. They have ignored a
second set of potential constructs, the object attributes. Second, they have studied latent
constructs only individually. They have not sought complex interactions between the
individual latent constructs. We will consider the implications and solutions for each of
these potential flaws.
The Inclusion of Object Triggers of Inconsistency
Inconsistency research has not directly studied the possible effects of object
attributes in generating inconsistency. Therefore, the most obvious advancement of
inconsistency research would be to include object attributes. Indirect sources regarding
object attributes suggest that such a study would prove fruitful. A vast amount of
research has occurred regarding the mechanisms inherent in the theory of inconsistency
since the inception of inconsistency theory. Namely, information processing and attitude
change have been studied exhaustively. These mechanisms interrelate to the theory of
how inconsistency occurs. Rosenberg’s theoretical foundation of the role of novelty,
profundity, and breadth, in particular, find support in these outside sources.
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We will begin with what the literature can relay about novelty. In Rosenberg’s
portrayal, novelty should trigger heightened information processing which, thereafter,
destabilizes the attitude to a state of inconsistency. Inconsistency studies have not
directly tested this. However, ensuing research from other fields has provided indirect
support of this logic. First, novelty does appear to stimulate information processing
(Petty & Wegener, 1998). Seen from the perspective of the individual, an attitude based
on a fully known issue (i.e., not novel) is more resistant to change (stronger) than a less
well articulated, poorly structured attitude (Pratkanis, 1989). Although Pratkanis
employed different constructs, the language is identical to that of Rosenberg’s theory.
Similarly, an attitude based on less information has a less well develop schema (Tesser,
1988). Even cultural truisms (i.e., the value of teeth brushing) seem subject to persuasion
primarily because the attitude exists on little knowledge or prior discussion (Pratkanis &
Greenwald, 1989). The inference possible from these findings is that novel information
can trigger the information processing that might destabilize attitude en route to change.
Rosenberg, also felt that the form or delivery of the message would be important
for the occurrence of inconsistency. Again, outside research has substantiated this.
Novel forms of communication, for instance, may influence information processing and
destabilization (Smith & Petty, 1996). For example, schematically inconsistent
information can stimulate self-investigation leading to destabilized attitude (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1987). Also, weak arguments, surprisingly, can do so as well simply because they
are unexpected and confusing (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). Aspects of the quality
and technique of the message have remained untested within inconsistency research.
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Rosenberg also implicates the force or persuasiveness of the message.
Specifically, the object must be profound and broad. Regarding profundity, a message
must provide sufficient force to reveal a threshold of ignorance below which
inconsistency could persist without bother. On the matter of breadth, an issue must shake
the tree of attitudinal material in a certain way. The attitudinal object must have
resonance across a structure, where multiple “loci of affect” within a complex structure
could be influenced, revealing hidden inconsistencies (Rosenberg, 1968, p. 77). This
summarizes Rosenberg’s basic theory. Despite the clear identification of the object as the
“actor” in the description, the tests of this theory have, however, focused on the latent
constructs of importance and vested interest. Regarding object attributes such as
profundity and breadth, inconsistency literature has been silent.
Research from other fields has stepped forward to clarify the roles of profound
and broad objects, and have revealed the prescience of Rosenberg’s work. Research into
the subject matter of multiplicity, or complexity, in particular, seems relevant. For
instance, some topics evoke fewer contradictory evaluations (such as sports and music),
while others summon numerous more contradictory evaluations (welfare, nuclear energy,
defense spending) (Pratkanis, 1984; Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1989). One can note
qualitative differences between the former topics and the latter. Broader, grander, or
more profound topics appear to have the best chance of summoning contradictions. The
study of complexity (Bieri, 1966), dimensionality (Scott, 1963), and differentiation
(Zajonc, 1960) would support this conclusion as well. Together they reveal a chain of
plausible causality (Figure 6). Namely, they reveal that aggregated attitudes on
aggregated topics (broader issues) rest on more associations and complexity; moreover,
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complexity predicts conflict (e.g., Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996). In other words,
the more conflicted the attributes of the issue are the greater potential for an unresolved
attitude. Ambiguity research seems related. It demonstrates that people are less certain
about an object when the respective number of its good and bad attributes tend toward
equivalence (Lemon, 1968).

Breadth

Multiplicity

Complexity

Conflict

Figure 6: Notional Chain of Object Attitudes Contributing to Conflict

These studies go well beyond the rough descriptions which Rosenberg offered as
predictors of inconsistency. In many respects, this chain of causality represents an
advancement in social psychology. At the same time, it merely flushes out, and makes
more compelling, the probable veracity of Rosenberg’s early roughly hewn premises. It
would appear that if advocates of inconsistency have previously overlooked this
antecedent set, sufficient evidence exists now to focus on it. One may even conclude that
ignoring the variance of perceived object attributes represents a significant flaw if prior
research.
To date, inconsistency research has not studied any aspect of this potential chain
of causality. The closest test of any of its logic is anecdotal evidence provided by Prislin
(1996), in which she changed the object along a dimension of profundity and breadth to
find that inconsistency levels changed predictably. On the other hand, Gross, Holtz, and
Miller (1995) have already folded ambivalence into the discussion. We argue that the
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logic should hold for inconsistency as well. Multiplicity, complexity, and the number of
potential conflicts inherent in the issue likely serve as an important function in an
information process that generates inconsistency. Since this has not been studied relative
to inconsistency, it would appear that many empirical tests await to link these numerous
outside studies to the inconsistency concept. If nothing else, one must question whether
the lack of controls for a variance in perceived object attributes led to the conflicting and
equivocal results of prior studies of antecedents.

The Value of Object Attribute Considerations for Resistance Studies
Looking at the research that has taken place relative to inconsistency, we can infer
that the issues which inconsistency literature has studied – such as welfare, nuclear
energy, and abortion – have actually implicitly provided the necessary complexity and
profundity for inconsistency to occur. That is to say, these issues at least met the criteria
of being novel, profound and broad, even if their variance was not included in the model.
This begs the question: Assuming the object must contain a certain degree of these object
attributes, does organizational transformation meet the required threshold of these
qualities of novelty, profundity, and breadth in order to even trigger inconsistency?
Regarding novelty, we presume that it occurs, on some significant level, for most
employees during a change initiatives. Almost by definition, organizational
transformation provides novel stimuli and material for contemplation. In support of this,
the research on the value of routines suggests that change initiatives may have a rather
low threshold to trigger psychological reactions (Oreg, 2003). Initiatives that modify
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routines inject novelty into the daily actions of individuals and, therein, force a
confrontation of the mind with novelty.
On the matter of breadth and depth, one has to more closely assess the type of
change at hand. Independent research about change agents has categorized
organizational change agents into three levels of significance: alpha, beta, and gamma
(Beer & Walton, 1987; Golembiewski, Billingsley, & Yeager, 1976; Porras & Silvers,
1991). Alpha describes a mere variation in the current state or routine. Beta changes
require a new understanding of the issue. And Gamma requires a complete
reconceptualization of a matter, an addition to or a replacement of a perspective –
something along the lines of Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962). The
authors associate beta and gamma with important resistance effects.
This codification of change-types relative to resistance provides an interesting
parallel to the study of object attributes within social psychology. Each attempts to
measure the potential significance of an issue to an individual. Moreover, each relates to
information processing challenges. Given our analysis of what should trigger
inconsistency, we would speculate that beta and gamma categories (which constitute the
bulk of the types of changes that have been studied, and which strongly relate to
resistance) should also provide sufficient material for inconsistency to occur (Piderit,
2000). Why would that be the case?
We can look at that from two perspectives. First, from the perspective of the
individual, beta and gamma changes should place the greatest forces on attitude structure
because they demand more than mere mindless behavioral responses, but rather an
intellectual understanding and an internalization of the principles underpinning the
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initiative. That represents a high demand for information processing. Second, from the
perspective of the object, beta and gamma changes contain multitudes, complexity,
ambiguity, and conflicting material. The logic that developed this system of change
types mirrors the logic that we employ. Namely, certain change initiatives present
demanding situations that tax the information processing of individuals. We add that in
such a challenging information processing environment, inconsistency may occur.
Resistance studies have already recognized that object uncertainty during beta and
gamma changes, especially in regards to how the initiative affects one’s personal values
and goals, appears an important factor in how individuals react to change (e.g., Isabella,
1990; Lines, Selart, Espedal, & Johansen, 2005). Missing in those previous resistance
studies, however, is the contemplation of inconsistency in those reactions. An
inconsistency study would appear a nature extension of the thinking already occurring
relative to change types.
The only question remaining is how to best introduce the concept of object
attributes (as perhaps the measure of change’s profundity and breadth) into a study of
inconsistency and resistance simultaneously. One preexisting response to beta and
gamma changes provides us direction. Resistance research has responded to the
troubling aspects of beta and gamma changes by considering the role of others in easing
the burden of organizational change. We take a similar tact. This forces us to leave
behind a rich bevy of potential discrete hypotheses regarding object attributes which we
have “teed up” in the analysis so far. That is to say, we could use a measure of the
object’s objective or subjective profundity, importance, or scope (i.e., setting those as
variables). However, current research into resistance inspires us to take a different tact.
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We look at the role of others in mitigating the influences of a presumed preexistence of
significant levels of those attributes. In this approach, we can assume that beta and
gamma changes inherently provide profundity and breadth. However, since the ultimate
issue of importance is the perception of profundity and breadth, we can either choose a
subjective measure of those constructs, or we can take our approach. We will determine
how managerial, situational, environments elements during the change process can
reduce complexity, profundity, ambiguity, and novelty of the change initiative, and
therein make the process of attitude formation easier. Without attention to the object
attributes, prior studies have missed an important line of research with many potential
vectors of inquiry. Given the important extant literature within resistance studies
regarding environment and the role of leadership, we choose to consider those influences
in our model.

The Inclusion of the Elaboration-Likelihood Model
A second failing of previous inconsistency research relates to how it has tested the
latent construct. Looking at the failure of their methodologies will provide us additional
rationale for the choice we make to test environment or contextual factors in our model.
Tests have traditionally tested the numerous constructs related to two general concepts:
the amount of direct experience, and the vested interest. The first implies passive
exposure, the other a specific motivated relationship to the issue. Neither grouping of
antecedents has produced significant results. Several theories of attitude formation would
suggest this approach is correctly focused, but incomplete. Models such as in the Theory
of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991),the Heuristic-Systemic Model (HSM) (Chaiken,
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1987), and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)
emphasize that complex dynamics involving multiple latent constructs govern attitude
formation. Each of these models has sufficient similarities to accommodate and explain
many results (Petty & Wegener, 1998). We will specifically look how the ELM would
provide direction for a modification of the approach taken thus far.
The ELM (Figure 7) specifically identifies two necessary processes in order to
formulate a well-structured attitude (Petty & Wegener, 1998). First, an individual must
have the motivation to engage an issue. This references the traditional variables of vested
interest, personal relevance, and importance. Second, the individual must have the
opportunity to engage the issue. This covers the traditional variables of knowledge,
direct experience, and amount of prior thinking. Figure 7 shows the stages from
motivation through the elaboration stage, where opportunity meets motivation. The
confluence of motivation and opportunity leads to elaboration which leads to consistency
and strong attitudes.
The ELM proposes that mere opportunity to previously assess an issue is
inadequate to produce consistency attitudes. One must also have motivation to seize that
opportunity in an active way. Developing a well-structured attitude, from this
perspective, requires interest to engage in the information processing. Processing does
not simply befall a person. It requires analysis, synthesis, contemplation and reflection.
Alternatively, we should not assume that motivation produces opportunity. Barriers to
opportunity exist in real practical terms. Exclusion from social or formal discussion,
distraction, miscommunication, or transmission interference (noise, etc.) would delimit
opportunity. Therefore, one must either assess both motivation and opportunity in order
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to capture all the dynamics of consistent attitude formation, or one must develop a latent
construct that embodies both elements. Studying each in isolation provides an
incomplete picture of the antecedents of information processing and thus to consistency
forming dynamics.

1

2

3

4

Potential Mediating
Processes:
Antecedent Conditions
(Motivation and Ability
to Think)
Personal Relevance
Issue Importance
Distraction
Repetition
Need for Cognition
Etc.

Structural
Consistency

Message
Elaboration

Attitude Accessibility
Knowledge
Acquisition
Certainty/ Confidence

Attitude Consequences
Temporal Persistence
Resistance of Persuasion
Impact on Judgment,
Intentions
And Behaviors

Figure 7: Steps of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty et al., 1995)

The basic principles of the ELM rest upon well-developed research from various
sources. The ELM treats information processing from a holistic perspective (Petty &
Wegener, 1998), and represents arguably the most important models of attitude formation
today (Crano & Prislin, 2006; Petty and Wegener, 1998). Moreover, it is consanguineous
with inconsistency theories. Both rely on notions of schema. Illusions to schematicity
occur throughout consistency theories as well as in reference to inconsistency
(Rosenberg, 1968; Schleicher et al, 2004). As it applies to the ELM, when the conditions
for elaboration are present, schema become summoned by motivation and opportunity,
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and become accessed, rehearsed, and manipulated more extensively than otherwise (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986). This elaboration strengthens the interconnectedness of components
within the schema, creating greater consistency and resilience. This basic interpretation
of strong attitude formation finds broad support throughout the literature (e.g., Judd &
Krosnick, 1989; Thompson & Zanna, 1995; Wilson, Kraft, & Dunn, 1989), and appears
amenable to the concept of inconsistency.
The significant covariance between commitment and inconsistency found in prior
research (Hodson et al., 2001) may provide evidence of this thinking. In Hodson et al.’s
study commitment represents the product of two traditional variables, importance and
certainty. Importance taps the issue of motivation. Motivation should negatively vary
with inconsistency. Certainty, though not directly a measure of opportunity or
experience, may imply that experience has occurred since certainty varies with repetition
and experience (e.g., Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Rosenberg, 1968; Ruth, Gross, Holtz, &
Miller, 1995). Certainty should negatively relate to inconsistency. The results of this
study show, indeed, a negative relationship between commitment and inconsistency. It
may provide the first look at evidence of the ELM working in relationship to
inconsistency, though the authors do not comment on the novelty of this finding nor
expound upon it. We feel that commitment represents the type of construct upon which
inconsistency research should focus.
How is it that inconsistency research has not yet applied the guidance of the
ELM? Isolationism appears to be to blame. The authors of the ELM have provided
extensive research on attitudinal conflict theories. However, their efforts have remained
entirely trained on the sister construct of inconsistency, ambivalence. The scientific
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isolationism that has characterized all of the strength variables (Eagly, 1992) has yet to
ease in the field of attitudinal conflict. It renders the studies of inconsistency and
ambivalence nearly foreign to each other. In addition, Chaiken, the most prominent of
modern proponent of inconsistency, had devised the competing, though related, model of
the HSM (mentioned previously). While Chaiken does not summon the HSM in her
studies of inconsistency, personal biases may have limited her inclination to consider the
ELM. Lastly, during Chaiken’s work in the 1980’s, the ELM still lacked much of the
validation it has today. In fact, the unfurling of its components and ultimate validation
are still occurring today (Petty et al., 1995).
The current study, therefore, has implications across three domains: inconsistency
research, resistance research, and ELM research. The ELM remains a composite of small
pieces of evidence, with some missing. For instance, of all the pieces of the puzzle that
have been examined, the postulated mediating processes in this model (the third step in
the process of Figure 7) have received little scrutiny (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995).
Inconsistency research has, indeed, provided evidence of the steps 3 and 4, but none of
steps 1 and 2. In other research, much of the other efforts have measured antecedents
directly to the strength results (steps 1 and 4), and skipping over the step where
consistency would come into play (e.g., Conner et al., 2002). The results are supportive
of the ELM, though they remain disjointed. Tests of the mediating steps have begun
(e.g., Petty, Haugvedt, & Rennier, 1995). However, the mediating studies have not yet
specifically related to consistency. Studying a new antecedent set for inconsistency
(informed by the ELM) should contribute greatly to the entire concept.
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Resistance Constructs as Antecedents to Inconsistency
What guidance does the ELM provide in the context of organizational change?
As mentioned previously, the current study investigates inconsistency in the presence of
persuasion. The ELM, through its incorporation of multiple variables, serves not just to
elucidate the nature of attitude formation but also to explain the nature of persuasion
(Petty & Wegener, 1998). ELM helps explain the interplay of forces of message,
recipient, source, and context into a single model. Figure 8 provide a generic view of
mediational analysis of attitude change that has guided most persuasion research (Petty &
Wegener, 1998). It relates to our model of the interaction of individual and object
attributes. Attitude formation and change occur in response to all four elements of this
Figure. They occur through the correct interplay of the attributes of the attitudinal object,
the messenger’s style, the recipient’s prior knowledge structures and attitude, and the
social context (McGuire, 1969; Petty & Wegener, 1998). An examination of just one
independent variable would appear to be inadequate except under controlled
circumstances. Oreg, indeed, found that information alone was not enough to reduce
resistance to organizational change (2006).
Given our context, an individual in the role of persuader (for example, the
manager) filters or influences the whole array of potential triggers for information
processing: the amount of knowledge, the quality of message, and the sense of
importance. The messenger may also intentionally frame the issue to reduce ambiguity
and complexity, and to make it more accessible for review. An effective persuader is
aware of context, and is sensitive to the needs of the audience. Such a manager can
create an environment and message that meets the inherent needs of individuals to engage
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in elaboration. This inserts the manager into the mediating role between the object and
the individual. In the most basic level, Norman (1975) revealed that the messenger (a
confederate) plays an important role in persuading an inconsistent individual. However,
Norman does not ask if either the manner or the quality of the persuasion matters.
Persuasion research and the strength of the ELM model direct us to ask those questions.
Independent
Variables

Mediating
Processes

Outcome

Source

Message

Affective
Process

Cognitive
Process

Attitude
Change

Recipient
Behavioral
Process

Context

Figure 8: General Model of Attitude Change (Petty & Wegener, 1998)

Based on the ELM, inconsistency should negatively correlate to managerial
techniques which would reduce the ambiguity and complexity of the object, improve the
quantity and quality of information, help provide a sense of importance and personal
relevance, and stimulate the motivation and concern about the issue at hand. The
manager can touch upon all the constructs outlined in the literature review thus far to
explain the attitude formation.
A set of constructs exists within resistance studies that imply actions such as we
have just described, that would produce a conducive environment. Resistance studies
have demonstrated a value of the following constructs in both influencing attitude and in
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reducing behavioral resistance: communication, participation, managerial consistency,
managerial understanding of the issue, managerial supportiveness, and structured
methodology (Erwin & Garman, 2010; Lines, 2005). A review of their respective
findings as well as a dose of theory from the ELM suggests they should also reduce
inconsistency.
The task at hand requires a degree of inference. First, these constructs have not
previously been studied relative to consistency. We need to build that relationship based
on the nature of their relationship to attitude and behavior. Second, they also differ
qualitatively from the precise constructs aimed at specific latent processes. Third, they
also differ from the precise measure of attitude objects commonly used to assess
constructs such as complexity. That being said, Wanberg and Banas (2000) explain how
they function, rationalizing the distinct value of them. These constructs represent
“proximal, context constructs” instead of traditional psychological dispositional
variables, and are therefore more inclined to embody “interpersonal dynamics (2000, p.
134).” In attitude formation, the objects may contain relevant attributes, and the
individual may contain relevant attributes as well. In between these lies the context, the
messenger, the environment and the acts of management. This set focuses on that middle
ground between object and individual.
As we investigate predictors of inconsistency, we will allude to the following
chain of reasoning, which helps characterize the inferences necessary to link this
unprecedented set of predictors to inconsistency (Figure 9). The solid-lined constructs
reference those steps in the process that have clear empirical links between each other.
For instance, our set of antecedents has previously been related to the attitude of
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openness to change and to supportive behaviors. The reasons given for these extant
relationships help us fill the gaps in our chain of effects. Sorting through the various
discussions we see that they provide support for our reasoning: predictors create a setting
for elaboration to occur, which then permits consistency to emerge.

(+)
Antecedents

Conditions
Setting
Context
Climate
etc.

(+)

(+)

(+)
Elaboration

Consistency

Attitude/Behaviors

Figure 9: Proposed Causal Relationship between Antecedents and Inconsistency

We will study the following five antecedents: participation, communication,
structured procedure, managerial supportiveness, and supervisor supportiveness.
Regarding participation, numerous studies have demonstrated that the inclusion of
individuals into the change process (i.e., active participation) reduces behavioral
resistance (e.g., Giangreco & Pecci, 2005; Lines, 2004; Msweli-Mbanga & Potwana,
2006). Other studies have, more importantly, empirically linked participation to an
attitude of openness to change (e.g., Miller Johnson, & Grau, 1994; Lines et al., 2005;
Wanberg & Banas, 2000). Why should participation positively influence attitude?
Participation, as a construct, describes the opportunities to influence and engage with the
change initiative. In a weaker from, participation gives a voice to employees (Lines et
al., 2005). Studies of participation offer the explanation and empirical support that
suggests it could improve the consistency of attitudes as well. First, participation
produces trust in management (Korsgaard & Robinson, 1995). Employees are likely to
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reciprocate the trust by honestly engaging in the issue (Lines et al., 2005). This honest,
active participation can increase understanding and internalization of the initiative. As a
second explanation, participation also partially removes the delineation between
management and employees. This may stimulate elaboration because it engenders
ownership of the issues, vested interest, and commitment. Third, a new social identity in
relationship to management may also reduce the saliency of possible conflicting values
between subgroups (Turner, 1987). The suppression of possibly conflicting values might
reduces the complexity of the task of attitude formation.
The work on dissonance underlies some of these interpretations and also yields an
explanation that serves our inferential extension of participation’s effects on consistency
(Festinger, 1957). Dissonance theory belongs to the family of consistency theories
discussed previously, but highlights the role of behavior as a causal force in creating
consistency. It is well established in dissonance theory that one’s actions can influence
one’s attitudes to be congruent with those actions (a reversal of the attitude-behavior
causal paradigm). The “mental dissonance” experienced when attitude and behaviors are
out of line force a transformation of attitude to reduce the bothersome experience of
being in conflict with one’s values. Dissonance theory espouses that the resolution of
conflict works on the intra-attitudinal level as well. When feeling and cognitions are
inconsistent, this requires resolution as well. Participation, because it induces a given
behavior, triggers the process by which attitudes restructure themselves in support of
these behaviors. Similarly, work on sensemaking theory suggests that actively
interacting (participating) with an issue gives it meaning and structure (Stensaker &
Falkenberg, 2007). Interaction with an issue activates schemas, in which individuals
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develop the framework for understanding an issue, and therein resolve uncertainty and
ambiguity regarding that issue (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). Such schema formation is an
important tool in pedagogy. Sensemaking also give individuals the opportunity to
develop the rationale to justify the transformation initiative to themselves (Maitlis, 2005).
Therefore, participation, if it triggers such mental processes of dissonance resolution and
sensemaking, may bring about specific attitudes and possibly well-structured attitudes.
Also, in agreement with the ELM’s understanding of schema, participation provides
repetitive interaction with the object, which creates both opportunity to better understand
this issue as well as motivation (Petty & Wegener, 1998). Participation, in short, sets up
the conditions for elaboration.
Hypothesis 1a: Employee perceptions of their ability to actively participate in the
formulating the change initiative will negatively relate to affective-cognitive
inconsistency regarding the change initiative.

One can posit the role of communication in numerous ways. When a manager
communicates, the message is supposed to cover a wide array of issues, including the
justification for the change, the vision, the role of individuals, and the consequences
(Aremankis et al., 1993). Lewis determined the perceived quality of the communication
reduced resistance (2006). Wanberg and Banas identify that receiving communication
from an authoritative source reduces resistance (2000). The same studies that have
looked at participation’s relationship to openness to change have investigated
communication as well. Their explanations, as well as studies from other disciplines,
permit us to link communication to the process of consistency.
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We offer three different interpretations of how communication works in general.
At the most basic level, communication understood as mere transmission provides the
information about the issue. Is this sufficient? After all, knowledge and experience have
repeatedly failed to correlate to inconsistency (e.g., Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Prislin,
1996). Communication, especially in our context, is rarely just the transmission of
information. It has the purpose (or should, according to Armenakis et al, 1993) of
allowing employees to understand the personal importance and overall relevance of the
change. Communication can have broad effects on the individual that are not
immediately apparent from a transmission perspective. For instance, communication
influences affective processing of that information, due to a reduction of anxiety
(Wanberg & Banas, 2000). This could make the process of attitude formation less
intimidating. In an environment of change that is typically described as anxious and
uncertain (e.g., Lines at al., 2005), we probably cannot overestimate the affective role of
good communication.
The second interpretation addresses the cognitive function of communication.
Communication provides information that reduces uncertainty about the event (Miller,
Johnson & Grau, 1994). This could reduce ambiguity which limits the chance of
ambivalence (or inconsistency). The alternative of poor communication environment,
moreover, is one where rumors and conflicting misinformation arises, which would inject
complexity into the task sorting out an issue to form a consistent attitude.
Communication, as a step above mere transmission, may provide sufficient justification
to include it in a study of consistency, so long as it alleviates anxiety and helps interpret
complex events. These would be important steps for the ELM.
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The cognitive interpretation already has some association to attitude and
inconsistency theory. The way communication frames the message touches upon the
saliency of values, term repeatedly summoned to explain the conflict underlying
inconsistency. Advocates of inconsistency have argued that saliency of contradictory
values behind inconsistency is what moderates behavior, because it makes those
contradictions more accessible during behavior (e.g., Fazio, 1987; Schleicher et al.,
2004). How does communication relate to saliency? Communication make certain
elements of the issue salient (Lines, 2005), and such saliency can govern which particular
values are triggered in the formation of attitudes (Fiske & Tayler, 1991). One would
expect that communication which addresses both pros and cons (but downplaying the
cons) thereby provides the saliency for a direct argument or path toward a particular
outcome. Therefore, information in a persuasive form may have the potential to reduce
the appearance of contradictory object elements, and reduce the saliency of
contradictions.
The ELM would caution us in retaining a myopic focus on cognitive effects such
as saliency, however. Likely, the greater potential of communication to trigger
consistency rests on both affective and cognitive elements, as well as a sense of
participation and inclusion. Rosenberg concluded that communication could reduce
inconsistency in so far as communication addresses the correct value set at play in
attitudinal conflict (Rosenberg, 1968). The ELM would propose that communication
would need to touch upon values and interests which have the potential to trigger
motivation and interest. Given the diversity of personal values, these interpretations
would suggest that the manipulation of salient issues may be a tricky and incomplete
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means for communication to influence consistency. Communication may need to have
influence beyond the alignment with exact values.
Communication may be able to summon broad effects of a sense of participation,
inclusion and trust. One-way communication may be able do this, even if it is highly
selective and partial, so long as the message is delivered in a certain way. Namely, work
into “social accounts” reveals how selective messages can still trigger trust (Cobb &
Wooton, 1998). Two-way communication more directly engenders a sense of trust and
openness (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Moreover, two-way
communication benefits from the concepts of participation. Indeed, the literature
regarding two-way communication and participation regularly discusses them as
intertwined forces. To the previous discussion of participation, we would add that
sensemaking occurs not just in the isolated mind of the individual but also in a social
environment (Weick, 1995). Two-way communication (and even well-conceived oneway communication) may be perceived as an opportunity of sensemaking, an act of
inclusion, or participation, whereby a joint understanding of the issue is created. Bovey
and Hede (2001b), who call for an advanced and codified form of communication during
organizational change, namely intervention, would appear to support a complex view of
how communication can works, and may need to work to create attitude change.
Each of these interpretations permits us to justify including communication as a
means to reduce inconsistency. However, this rationale also suggests that, if
communication influences consistency, it likely shares a considerable multicolinearity
with participation. Participation likely mediates the effects of communication on
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consistency. Although this does not amount to a hypothesis, we will investigate this in
the post hoc analysis.
Hypothesis 1b: Employee perceptions of the quality of communication about the
transformational initiative will negatively relate to affective-cognitive inconsistency
regarding the initiative.

Managerial supportiveness, supervisor supportiveness, and structured procedure
round out the list of common constructs studied in organizational behavior. Numerous
studies describe effects from these constructs that should foster attitudinal consistency
among employees (Lines, 05). The process models, for example, reveal the importance
of these in meeting important information processing needs. Individuals must understand
the need for change, gauge the appropriateness, judge the efficacy of management, gauge
the leadership commitment, and evaluate the personal relevance of the initiative
(Armenakis & Harris, 2009). While communication addresses some of these steps (i.e.,
need for change), these managerial techniques address those of efficacy and commitment.
It is believed these managerial constructs effect change in issues because they improve
trust in managers (Oreg, 2006), reduce skepticism (Stanley et al., 2005), improve
employee-manager relationship (Furst & Cable, 2008), improve the development climate
(Van Dam et al., 2008), and increase perceived fairness (Lines, 2005). Managerial
supportiveness (supportiveness) largely works because of the image and environment it
fosters. It has the potential to instill trust, and to create confidence in the manager
reliability and integrity (Van Dam et al, 2008). Research has demonstrated a variety of
psychological effects produced by trust, revealing trust to be quite a pervasive
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phenomenon (Dirks & Ferris, 2002). These positive attributes of environment, we posit,
characterize an environment where elaboration may occur because conditions for
motivation are improved. Cole et al. (2006) found that the quality of the change
procedure increased job satisfaction and reduced role ambiguity. With a reduction of
ambiguity, one should experience a reduction in ambivalence (or inconsistency). We
feel such research directly supports our belief that pervasive efforts on behalf of
management to create structure and to demonstrate managerial commitment and
seriousness about the initiative may produce important conditions. These conditions
stimulate elaboration.
These constructs all represent a qualitative component. An individual exposed to
these techniques, one my infer, has received quality opportunity and motivation to engage
with the issue. In the absence of these constructs, inconsistency would occur more
frequently and to greater degrees.
Hypothesis 1c: Employee perceptions of the degree of structured procedures
employed during organizational transformation will negatively relate to inconsistency
towards the change initiative.
Hypothesis 1d: Employee perceptions of managerial supportiveness during
organizational transformation will negatively relate to inconsistency towards the change
initiative.
Hypothesis 1e: Employee perceptions of direct supervisor supportiveness during
organizational transformation will negatively relate to inconsistency towards the change
initiative.
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Consistency as a Moderator
The ultimate reason to study attitudes, and the attributes of attitudes, lies in the
ability of attitudes to predict behavior (Crano & Prislin, 2006). It is no surprise,
therefore, that studies of inconsistent attitudes have focused on their ability to moderate
the important attitude-behavior relationship. As expected, inconsistency has repeatedly
revealed an attitude as ill-quipped to govern behavior. Namely, inconsistency weakens
the predicted relationship. The body of literature that has directly employed
inconsistency as a moderator is summarized in Table 2. Most of the above studies have
measured inconsistency in more than one test, adding greater credence to the short list of
publications.
Each study, with the exception of Fazio and Zanna, has found a significant effect
for consistency. Individuals with high consistency reveal an attitude-behavior correlation
in the range of .31 to .57. Individuals with low consistency reveal correlations from -.18
to .39, but tend towards a null correlation. Fazio and Zanna do not find significant
results, though propose that the nature of their sample and questions, which were initially
formed with a different moderator in mind, may have contributed to their non-significant
finding.
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Table 2: Evidence of Consistency as a Moderator

Authors

Independent Variable

Dependent Variable

DV Type

A-B Correlation
for High (Low)
Consistency
Operation Test Type Signif? Cohort (r=)

evaluaiton of participation volunteering for psych
in research
study

overt

Rosenberg median
& Norman divide

evaluaiton of participation volunteering for psych
Fazio & Zanna (1977) in research
study

overt

Norman

Chaiken & Baldwin
(1981)

median
intentional Rosenberg divide

Norman (1975)

Common ecology
environmentalism attitudes related activities

Franc (1999)

legalized abortion

Schleicher, Watt, &
Greguras (2004)

jobs satisfaction

Zhou (2010)

numerous advocay
actions

performance
intention to shop at
evaluation of department st store

yes

.51 (-.18)
.53 (.26)
.51 (.39)
.44 (.15)

regression no

yes

median
divide &
regression yes
intentional Norman
median
divide, &
overt
Rosenberg regression yes
median
intentional Rosenberg divide
yes

.398 (.068)
.313 (.114)

.45 (.0)
.57 (-.03)
.54 (-.11)
ANOVA

Despite the near consensus that inconsistency moderates the attitude-behavior
relationship, the body of literature contains four weaknesses: limited subject matter,
measurement construct, test type, and operationalizaion. These weaknesses qualify the
apparent consensus, and establish the need to check for moderation at this present
opportunity.
Looking at the independent and dependent constructs, one sees that inconsistency
has been applied to several different issues, ranging in profundity and potential breadth.
Some include hot-button issues like abortion. Others appear rather innocuous, such as
the issue of whether students would like to participate in a psychology study at the
university. Overall, however, the findings do not cast a wide net across attitudinal issues.
This is a distinct limitation of the research. Many decades of research have substantiated
that attitude findings cannot be generalized across attitude domains or categories
(Krosnick et al., 1993). Moreover, Rosenberg’s own claim of domain specificity should
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mandate diverse studies to be accomplished before substantial faith be placed on any
broad implications of this construct. Politics, sports, religion, policy, family, work,
entertainment, advertising – each of these could have different capacities to trigger
inconsistency and attitudinal conflict. Ambivalence research has indeed taken the steps
to explore a wide range of issues (e.g. Conner et al, 2003). Inconsistency has not.
Therefore, seeking moderation into the realm of organizational transformation has
important value of the field of inconsistency.
One also notices that half of the studies utilize intended behaviors, and the other
half actual, observed, overt behaviors. Intended behaviors hold a less respected place in
empirical literature, since differences emerge between stated intentions and what one
actually follows through on (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988). Intended
behaviors often serve as a convenient proxy when overt behaviors cannot be obtained
(such as has been admitted in the Zhou et al. study, 2009). Surveying attitude and
intended behaviors often overinflates the “attitude-behavior” correlation because people
tend to respond artificially consistently on surveys. In this case, it may overestimate the
true baseline, making a test of moderation easier to establish. The employment of direct
measures of behavior would qualitatively add to the literature.
Lastly, the studies vary in the quality of their moderation method and their
operationalizaion. Most of the publications have applied a median-split test to determine
significance. That standard, though still common among strength variables (Krosnick &
Petty, 1995), has lost some conviction within more statistically minded circles (Frazier, et
al., 2004). Rosenberg’s operationalization, discussed previously, also must be viewed as
a rough measure, better able to categorize than to precisely measure degrees of
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inconsistency. His operationalization may have sufficed for this lower fidelity of testing.
Thankfully, a few of these studies have applied both standards of moderation (Schleicher
et al., 2004; Franc, 1999). However, much work still needs to be accomplished to
reassess prior findings in light of more recent statistical standards, and more precise
moderation measurement.
As a final assessment of the entire body of literature, we would conclude that
without direct evidence to the contrary, our hypothesis would have to follow the trend of
prior studies. If all other things were held constant, inconsistency should moderate the
attitude towards organizational transformation.

Hypothesis 2: Inconsistency will moderate the relationship between the
aggregated score of Opinion of Change and the Observed Support for Change, such that
greater consistency will improve the correlations, and less consistency will degrade the
correlations.

Despite this hypothesis, we approach moderation with some skepticism since
numerous studies suggest that the attitude-behavior relationship in a workplace may not
function well enough to permit moderation. Organizational change provides a specific
new challenge for moderation. Will contextual factors such as financial remuneration,
career goals, role responsibility, work culture, and social pressure influence the presence
and function of inconsistency? One can imagine institutional pressures augmenting
inconsistency, as conflicted allegiance between two identities. Or perhaps people
compartmentalize an issue, and do not experience such cosmic identify conflict.
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Unfortunately, such questions are not only beyond inconsistency theory at this time, also
go beyond the scope of the data we have available. More importantly, these contextual
factors likely influence the baseline attitude-behavior relationship which will, itself, creat
a practical barrier for finding moderation. For instance, attitudes may not manifest
themselves in the same way when money is involved, as it would in a less consequential
environment (e.g. Belcher & Atcheson, 1976). Moreover, formal organizations, such as
the workplace, often institutionalize attitude and behavior, through a common
understanding (Zucker, 1983). Also, the relationship between attitude and behavior is
often changed by the groups in which individuals participate (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer,
1989). People function and behave differently across different organizations in which
they may belong. All of these studies imply that the baseline attitude-behavior
correlation may not occur as it would in the more pristine environments employed in
inconsistency research. Dissonance theory would suggest attitude and behaviors will
still correlate. But if these additional factors diminish the baseline relationship,
moderation may be immeasurable.

Consistency as a Mediator
Within inconsistency studies, inconsistency appears to happen equally across the
whole continuum of attitude extremity from positive to negative. No correlation between
consistency and overall attitude polarity has emerged in any prior studies (e.g. Schleicher
et al., 2004; Norman, 1975). Based on this body of knowledge, inconsistency is a global
or pervasive phenomenon, not just towards the neutral attitude, or towards one or the
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other valence. However, these studies have occurred in a rather unrealistic scenario of a
neutral environment. In reality, attitudes generally do not function in a stable or neutral
environment. Attitudes function in environments marked by messages with a purpose –
to persuade, influence or convince. The published studies have, therefore, focused
exclusively on the relative pristine possibility of attitude formation, and not on attitude
change. These represent two separate endeavors (Crano & Prislin, 2006).
Should we expect equal likelihood of inconsistency when management techniques
studied in our earlier test are present? Or, instead, will consistency occur more frequently
in support of change, and inconsistency more frequently in resistant attitudes? The latter
would suggest consistency would occur as part of attitude change. One might even infer
that consistency occurs as a mediating step towards attitude change. As a unique
contribution to inconsistency literature, our context and antecedent set permits us to truly
investigate the possibility of mediation. As a contribution to resistance literature, the
occurrence of a mediation process would convey the importance of reducing
inconsistency in the process of organizational transformation.
Common belief, as seen in the ELM, is that consistency does play a mediating
role for attitude change (e.g., Petty & Wegener, 1998; Crano & Prislin, 2006). Referring
back to the general attitude change model (Figure 8), some process occurs in either the
affective realm, cognitive, or intentional, which then – by virtue of the natural forces for
consistency – affects the other respective forms of processing. Petty & Wegener have
stated that almost every conceivable causal sequence of affect, cognition, and behavior
has been proposed to account for attitudes in at least some circumstances (1998). For
instance, within resistance research it has been determined that resistance can originate in
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just cognitive or just affective reactions (e.g. Fuegen & Brehm, 2004). However, Petty &
Wegener conclude that the accumulated literature makes it clear that although the
affective, cognitive, and behavioral bases of attitudes can be independent (Zanna &
Rempel, 1988), they are often inextricably interlinked just as the consistency theorists
have proposed (e.g. Rosenberg, 1960). This logic would imply that effective persuasion,
even if it employs mostly just a cognitive or just an emotional appeal, would nonetheless
ultimately trigger consistency as a mediating step towards attitude change.
But why should consistency mediate the antecedent set of management techniques
studied thus far? We suggest that persuasive management techniques such as
participation, communication, and structured procedure not only permit elaboration, but
also provide a vector. The provided information and context does not simply occur
innocently in the way described in Rosenberg’s research where mere exposure naturally
triggers a realization of inconsistency. Instead, the information has been contrived to
produce a particular reaction, a transformation of attitude towards a particular polarity.
In the neutral scenario, information triggers a bout of inconsistency, which then gives
way naturally to a crystallized structure (Rosenberg, 1968). In the latter, information in a
persuasive form trigger the steps of inconsistency and then convergence, but also produce
a shift from where convergence may have initially occurred based on pre-existing values
(Figure 10). Persuasion alters the potential bounds in which convergence may occur.
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Figure 10: Theoretical Heuristic of Attitude Formation During Persuasion

Our explanation is consistent with Rosenberg’s theory, but it is not complete.
Namely, Rosenberg’s theory states that events can trigger heightened information
processing and inconsistency, and then ultimately lead to consistency in a new state.
Rosenberg is proposing two mediations in his theory. In two different stages of
development, inconsistency (stage 1) and then consistency (stage2) could mediate attitude
change. With a single test measurement, we cannot say if any given individual should be
in stage 1 or stage 2. However, individuals engaging in heightened information
processing and still experiencing inconsistency should not yet have as positive of an
overall attitude as those who have completed the information processing and crystallized
an attitude. Stage 1 individuals should not have a positive relationship between
consistency and overall attitude. After all, they may have had an initial attitude anywhere
on the continuum when they started. In agreement with prior studies, inconsistency could
happen anywhere. However, stage 2 individuals should reveal the proposed positive
correlation between consistency and attitude. At that stage, a shifted form of
crystallization should have occurred.
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With a single test of mediation, we will not be able provide support for both
stages of this explanation. Nor, do we have sufficient theory to try to decipher with other
variables, who is in which stage at the time of our test. That would require a multi-test
format, or a panel study. Instead, we expect to capture the stage 2 individuals, and hope
their presence is sufficiently robust to provide a mediation effect. In reality, given the
presence of two cohorts, we would not expect that relationship between consistency and
attitude to be strong, since the stage 1 individual would work as a suppressor is in the
data. Nonetheless, we make the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Consistency will positively relate to overall attitude measure of
openness to change.

Hypothesis 4a: Consistency will partially mediate the relationship between
participation and the attitude of openness to change.
Hypothesis 4b: Consistency will partially mediate the relationship between
communication and the attitude of openness to change.
Hypothesis 4c: Consistency will partially mediate the relationship between
structured procedure and the attitude of openness to change.
Hypothesis 4d: Consistency will partially mediate the relationship between
managerial supportiveness and the attitude of openness to change.
Hypothesis 4e: Consistency will partially mediate the relationship between
supervisor supportiveness and the attitude of openness to change.
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With Hypotheses 1a-1e, as well as Hypotheses 3 and 4, we have proposed
necessary relationships for three of the four paths for mediation. We do not make the
hypothesis for the necessary fourth path that manager techniques correlate to attitude.
Since all of these constructs have demonstrated a relationship to openness to change in
the past (e.g., Wanberg, & Banas, 2000), we accept those results and feel their
relationship to attitude provides no new contribution to literature.

Summary
Determining the differential capacity of organizations to adapt to exogenous
influences remains a primary concern of resistance studies (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008).
The inclusion of inconsistency adds to the aim to differentiate seemingly similar
individuals and thus seemingly similar organizations along finer psychological detail.
However, in reviewing the literature, it is clear that the current state of research regarding
inconsistency cannot provide guidance or empirical support for all the steps of the
attitude process, from the antecedents of inception to the functional effects on behavior.
These gaps are both empirical and, due to the age and neglect of the original constructs,
even theoretical. Prior studies have failed to synthesize more contemporary studies to
strengthen the core concepts. As such, we expanded this literature review to cover those
new advances. We structure the methodology in the same spirit – to directly address
prior methodological weaknesses. While some of these should improve our tests, other
standards (i.e., multiple regression) have the potential to reveal the existing weakness of
the model and theory. A succinct affirmation of those methodological choices, in line
with the previous discussion, ensues.
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III. Methodology
Test Subjects
We employed archival data from government employees of a particular state whose
departments had recently begun an organizational transformational initiative. A broad
survey had been conducted to determine the factors of resistance towards an initiative
consisting of a new quality control process. We identified the level of change as a beta or
gamma change consistent with the literature.
Of the 759 employees in these departments, 436 responded with usable surveys. For
our analysis, however, the measure of behavior proved to be a limiting factor to data
analysis. Supervisors provide responses to only 177 of their subordinates. Similarly,
most of the supervisors themselves were not assessed on this measure, presumably
because they did not have immediate supervisors included in this survey. Of the 177
responses to the behavioral measure, we were only able to apply analysis for all three
tests to 145 individuals, given omissions in some of the other variables. No regularity
appears in the nature of these omissions. We conclude they were random omissions to
test items.
To ensure supervisors had not selected only to measure employees with significant
differences from the entire population, we applied t-tests to common dispositional traits
of age, gender, education, time in position, and time employed (Appendix B). The
descriptives are summarized in Table 3. We also applied t-tests for overall attitude and
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inconsistency, the main subject of our study. None of the t- tests proved a significant
difference between the usable sample and the entire population of respondents, with the
exception of gender. Males comprised 70% of the population, but only 60% of our
sample of 145 individuals. This is a limitation of our analysis, although no prior tests of
consistency have found gender to be a relevant variable. Reassuring are the t-tests for
attitude and inconsistency. Of all the variables, they revealed the least likelihood of Type
I and Type II errors, giving us confidence that the sample is representative of the whole
population for the purposes of our study.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Sample

Variable
(N)
Age
N =132
Time in Position
N= 135
Time as Employee
N = 138
Attitude
N= 145
Inconsistency
N= 145
Education
Gender
N= 139

Mean
47.64 years
5.12 years
12.28 years
63.33
.459
College graduate
60% male

Measures
All variables used a 5-pt Likert-scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly
agree. The antecedents to inconsistency included participation, communication,
structured procedure, department level leadership supportiveness, and supervisor
effectiveness. All antecedent tools have previously been validated (Wanberg & Banas,
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2000). All variables employed subjective measures from the respondents regarding the
actions taken by management and supervisors. The full list of test items is in Appendix
A.
The participation variable comprised 4 items, Cronbach alpha = .90. The variable
includes questions such as “I have been able to ask questions about the changes at work
before they were implemented,” and, “I have had some control over implementing
changes at work.” The communication variable consisted of 5 items regarding the
timeliness, usefulness, and adequacy of information, as well as the availability of twoway communication opportunities, Cronbach alpha = .92. The structured procedure
variable consisted of 6 questions, Cronbach alpha = .86. The intent of these questions
was to assess the degree to which the transformation activities involved a defined
process, which would include program management approach, metrics, and follow-up
efforts. Both the managerial supportiveness and supervisor supportiveness variables
consisted of 3 questions focusing on whether their respective level of leadership had led,
united the employees, and provided necessary resources, Cronbach alpha = .92 and .95,
respectively.
The behavioral variable consisted of a 3 item measure posed to direct supervisors
of employees, Cronbach alpha = .95. These questions asked the supervisor to assess the
employee on positive attitude, commitment, and overt support. Although attitude and
commitment generally are treated as latent constructs, by asking supervisors to assess
these latent constructs, we effectively ask them to infer them based on physical, outward
mannerisms, actions, or statements. In the end, all three become measures of overt
behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007), but require the supervisor to employ different shades
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of assessment and reasoning. The nature of this variable likely contributed to the low
response from employers. First, practical limitations may have presented themselves for
supervisors to have felt comfortable assessing commitment and attitude. Assessing
commitment and attitude may have appeared too vague or untenable for less proximal
employees. Again, ANOVA techniques have not identified any particular difference
between those assessed and not assessed. However, the list of variables for ANOVA
analysis is finite, and relevant distinguishing variables may not have been available. For
example, a clear implication of the way behavior was measured is that employers are
poorly represented, though not completely excluded from the analysis. This behavioral
variable remains a weakness of the study.
For an attitudinal measure of openness to change, we employed a previously
validated 18-item tool, Cronbach alpha = .95. Openness to Change has been determined
to be an important attitude in support of change (e.g., Herscovitch & Meyer, 2002; Miller
et al., 1994; Wanberg, & Banas, 2000; Van Dam et al, 2008). Applying factor analysis in
SPSS® we confirmed the presence of two distinct factors of 6 items each. The twofactor model demonstrated a good fit to the data. Applying AMOS, the NFI, IFI, and CFI
scores were .989, .992, and .992 respectively. And RMSEA was .060. We call one
factor the affective scale (Cronbach alpha = .89), and the other the cognitive scale
(Cronbach alpha = .93). The affective scale consisted of questions 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, and 17
from the set in Appendix A. The cognitive scale consisted of questions 7, 8, 9, 11, 13,
and 15 from that set. Each scale serves as our distinct inputs for a measure of affectivecognitive consistency. The overall measure of attitude retains all 18 questions to create a
overall summation.
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To measure affective-cognitive consistency, we turn to Norman’s (1975) proposed
a modification to Rosenberg’s initial operationalization. Norman attempted to correct for
the potential of extreme or erratic ranking scores from Rosenberg’s competitive-based
ranking method. Norman’s measure determines the normalized deviation from the mean
on each component (scale), and then takes the absolute value of their difference. A +.5
standard deviation on one scale and a +.3 on the other would create an inconsistency
score of .2. In that case, the respondent was above the mean on one scale more than on
the other, and this would constitute inconsistency. If the scores were a +.4 and -.2, then
that inconsistency score would be .6, having crossed from positive to negative attitude. A
smaller score means greater consistency. To avoid confusion, we regularly refer to this
variable as “inconsistency”, since a larger score equates to more inconsistency.
We follow a more contemporary approach and make an additional change to the
tool employed by Rosenberg. Rosenberg applied a measurement device based on the
concept of expectancy-value (Fishbein, 1963; Scott, 1969; Rosenberg, 1956). He held the
opinion that individuals form attitude based on assessing the discrete attributes of an
object. Therefore, Rosenberg identified probable discrete attributes. The individual
would assess the value of these discrete attributes (i.e., useful, rewarding, challenging).
Thereafter, the individual would assess the potential of the issue to either permit or block
the realization of those attributes. This approach requires a very deliberate process of
psychological assessing the issue. It would appear on the surface to evoke a detailed
assessment of a person’s attitude. However, this approach has been doubted (Chaiken et
al., 1995). Namely, the process requires an assumption that the chosen set of attributes
represents the entire attitude toward the issue. It assumes one can generalize from the
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finite select set to the whole attitude. This has not been demonstrated to be the case
except for some tangential studies recently conducted by Van Hareveld and Van der Pligt
(2004). Rosenberg and others have favored this interpretation. However, this method
does not constitute the common approach to measuring attitude at the present time.
Moreover, one could make the claim that the extra mental effort required to conceive of
an issue based on value and instrumentality makes the tool cognitively biased (Eagly et
al., 1994). The measure does, in fact, stem from a period in which cognitive consistency
occupied studies of attitude, and when affect held far less interest (Chaiken et al., 1995 ).
This same criticism of a cognitive bias has been levied towards the dual semanticdifferential approach of ambivalence, which bears a similarity (McGregor, et al., 1999).
Towards ambivalence, an additional criticism has been raised that one may be able to
compartmentalize certain values and not have them actually inform attitude (Breckler,
1994). One might say the same of Rosenberg’s expectancy-value as well.
Chaiken et al. (1995) have suggested that a less restrictive, and by extension less
cognitively biased, measure should accomplish the goal of inconsistency research as well.
Tests of less formalized measures have successfully produced results in consonance with
the more formal measure (e.g., Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Chaiken & Yates, 1985;
Schleicher et al., 2004; Zhou et al., 2009.) Recently, Schleicher et al. (2004) even
determined that a question set that merely tended towards affect, and another that tended
towards cognitive would produce significant results. We continue in this latter tradition.
We use the factor loadings of a traditional attitudinal measure. These items do
not use expectancy-value. Instead, they aim to measure general component-based
attitude. Items include, “The changes frustrate me,” “I look forward to such changes,”
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“The changes will benefit my organization,” and, “I find going through the changes
pleasing.” Although certain values are imbedded in these items, they are general in
nature. Moreover, the test does not then separately ask the individual to measure how
much the issue may actively inhibit those personal values. This tool captures general
attitudinal sentiment, with components loading, or tending, towards certain latent factors
(Schleicher et al., 2004).

Tests
For test of correlation, mediation, and moderation we employ standard regression
techniques (Frazier et al., 2004) using the statistical software package JMP®. For
studying the relationship between antecedents and inconsistency (Hypothesis 1a-1e), we
will employ an X by Y linear (bivariate) correlation. We set .05 as the significant
confidence level of the test.
For moderation (Hypothesis 2) we employ a multiple regression approach. As
previously mentioned, most have employed a median-split analysis whereby those with
above median consistency have their behavior regressed on attitude, and the same is done
separately for those with below median consistency. This traditional approach treats the
entire population as two separate cohorts. However, from a statistical perspective,
regression procedures are preferred over using artificial cut points because the latter leads
to a loss of information, and to either Type I or Type II errors (Frazier et al., 2004). In
multiple regression analysis, both the predictor and the moderator are entered as Xvariables versus the Y-variable of the outcome. Then the product terms of the predictors
and moderator are entered as an X-variable. If the product term is significant, then a
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moderation exists. Openness to Change would be nonlinearly related to behavior toward
change, depending on the level of inconsistency (Figure 11).
Inconsistency

Openness to
Change

Behavior
towards Change

Figure 11: Model of Moderation

For mediation (Hypotheses 4a-4e) we use a four step regression approach developed
by Kenny and colleagues (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986). It is considered the most
common means (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffmann, West, & Sheets, 2002). The first
step is to show a significant relationship between the predictor and the outcome.
Previous studies have demonstrated that all of our antecedents should correlate to
attitude. The second step is to show that the predictor is related to the mediator. The
results of this will come from our prior test of antecedents (Hypotheses 1a-1e). The third
step is to show that the mediator is related to the outcome variable (Hypothesis 3). The
fourth step is to show that the strength between the predictor and the outcome is reduced
when the mediator is included (Frazier et al, 2004). Based on the arguments necessary
for causality, one may infer mediation if the beta of the original predictor-outcome
relationship is reduced in the presence the mediator. Figure 12 represents these steps.
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Consistency

2

Participation,
etc.

3

1. (without mediation)
4. (with mediation)

Openness to
Change

Figure 12: Steps of the Mediation Model

IV. Results
Correlation
Hypothesis 1a through Hypothesis 1e predicted that given variables of the
employee’s management quality would predict the level of inconsistency the individual
experiences. To test these hypotheses we employed simple linear (bivariate) regression.
We regressed inconsistency on a set of five variables related to management:
participation (1a), communication (1b), structured procedure (1c), managerial
supportiveness (1d), and leadership supportiveness (1e). In support of Hypotheses 1a-1e,
each of the antecedents individually reveals a significant negative correlation to
inconsistency (Appendix C). Table 4 shows the correlation matrix between the variables
employed in each of our tests. No hypothesis was made regarding the interrelationships
or collinearity of the predictors themselves. To serve as an example of the variance
pattern and fit line, we have provided a graph of participation, the patterns of which
appear highly representative of all five (Figure 13).
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Openness to
Change
Behavior to
Change
Inconsistency

(.95)
.309**

(.95)

-.247**

.042

N/A

Participation

.599**

.319**

-.275**

(.90)

Communication

.595**

.294**

-.266**

.748**

(.92)

Structured
Procedure
Managerial
supportiveness
Supervisor
Effectiveness

.468**

.117

-.319**

.479**

.700**

(.86)

.577**

.221**

-.296**

.595**

.750**

.737**

(.92)

.387**

.175*

-.230**

.405**

.459**

.457**

.612**

Supervisory
Effectiveness

Managerial
supportiveness

Structured
Procedure

Communication

Participation

Inconsistency

Behavior to
Change

Openness to
Change

Table 4: Correlation Matrix

(.95)

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2 tailed).
N/A. Cronbach alpha is not applicable to this measure.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that inconsistency would negatively relate to the overall
attitude of openness to change. We tested this as a simple linear regression between
inconsistency, as a predictor, and openness to change, as the outcome variable. In
support of this hypothesis, the test shows that inconsistency negatively relates to
openness to change (r = -.247, p <.01). This result is the same as stating that consistency
positively relates to overall attitude. Figure 14 depicts the regression line.
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Figure 13: Correlation of Participation to Inconsistency

Figure 14: Correlation of Inconsistency to Openness to Change

Mediation
Hypothesis 4a through 4e predicted that consistency would mediate the
relationship between a set of predictors and the attitudinal outcome of openness to
change. Those predictors were the same as in the previous tests: participation (1a),
communication (1b), structured procedure (1c), managerial supportiveness (1d), and
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leadership supportiveness (1e). Consistency shows significant mediating effects for all
five antecedents that we tested.
To determine mediation, we followed the 4-step procedure outlined by Baron and
Kenny (1986). The first three steps employ bivariate regression. The determining
relationship employs a multivariate regression. For hypothesis 4a, we first showed the
relationship between participation and openness to change. Second, we showed that the
participation is related to consistency. The test for Hypothesis 1a demonstrated this
relationship. Third, we showed that consistency is related to openness to change. The
test of Hypothesis 3 demonstrated this. Fourth, we regressed the outcome, openness to
change, to the additive multivariate form (participation and consistency). This last step
reveals the relationship of the predictor in the presence of the mediator. If beta is lower
in this controlled model than in the baseline model (step 1), mediation has occurred.
Figure 15 shows the significant findings for participation. Figures 15 through 19 convey
the same message that our antecedents were mediated by consistency. The original
correlations for inconsistency have been reversed and the term consistency has been
applied to better convey the nature of the hypothesis.
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.129

Consistency

Participation

Without mediation: 6.68
With mediation: 6.407

5.87

Openness to
Change

Figure 15: Results of Consistency mediating Participation (all numbers are betas)

.141

Consistency

Communication

Without mediation: 7.47
With mediation: 7.15

5.87

Openness to
Change

Figure 16: Results of Consistency mediating Communication (Hypothesis 4b)

.207

Structured
Procedure

Consistency

Without mediation: 7.23
With mediation: 6.69

5.87

Openness to
Change

Figure 17: Results of Consistency mediating Structured Procedure (Hypothesis 4c)
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.153

Managerial
Effectiveness

Consistency

Without mediation: 7.09
With mediation: 6.78

5.87

Openness to
Change

Figure 18: Results of Consistency mediating Supervisor Effectiveness (Hypothesis 4d)

.115

Supervisor
Effectiveness

Consistency

Without mediation: 4.59
With mediation: 4.13

5.87

Openness to
Change

Figure 19: Results of Consistency mediating Supervisor Effectiveness (Hypothesis 4e)

Moderation
Hypothesis 2 predicted that inconsistency would moderate the relationship
between attitude and behavior. The interaction term is defined as the product of attitude
and inconsistency. The test of moderation requires a single regression run in which we
insert the individual variables of attitude and inconsistency, and then the product term of
attitude and inconsistency (Frazier et al, 2004). The test is significant for moderation if
the product term is significant. The baseline relationship between attitude and behavior
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in our sample is r = .30. We predicted that we would improve that relationship. The test
did not prove significant (Table 5)
Table 5: Results of Moderation Test

V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research
Predictors of Inconsistency
The present study reveals that inconsistency, as a parsimonious construct of
conflicting evaluations, occurs in the face of organizational change. More importantly,
we have learned that it does not present itself randomly or inexplicably within the
population, but rather persists relative to contextual factors. Each of our intended
antecedents proved significant (range, r = -.23 to -.32). As that they each constituted
subjective evaluations of management, the correlation can be expressed as such: the
perceived quality of managers’ and supervisors’ actions in leading organizational change
related negatively to the presence of internal conflict. Alternatively, one can say that
those who experience consistency also appreciated these general activities by
management more than those who were inconsistent. This was true for all five variables:
95

participation, communication, structured procedure, managerial supportiveness, and
supervisor effectiveness.
In our literature review, we spent the greatest effort to justify the inclusion of
communication in our study. The inclusion of all of our variables rested largely on their
probable ability to foster elaboration. Communication as a mere transmission of
information, however, would appear inadequate to the task of creating elaboration if
motivation is not already present. That being said, we had contemplated a more complex
mental effect for communication. We suggested that communication created a sense of
participation, and therefore functioned within the Elaboration Likelihood Model by
providing not just information, but also a sense of motivation that is common during
participation. The strong correlation to participation (in fact the strongest of our set, r =
.74) implies a germane interrelationship. A test a mediation analysis reveals that
communication does, in part, influence consistency because of its fostering a sense of
participation. Participation mediates communication rather strongly (beta reduced from .14 to -.07).
Admittedly, not all communication necessarily should create a sense of
participation. Our variable asked about timeliness, usefulness, comprehensibility, and
adequacy. Additional components of communications could also prove important. Our
test is not a detailed analysis of communication. It permits merely broad statements.
Therefore, we suggest that managers should consider the quality and purpose of their
communication carefully. Some aspects of it, roughly hewn by the individual test items
in our measure, are capable of producing a sense of participation. In our study, this sense
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of participation proved to be quite important for mediating its effects on attitude
formation.
Communication, much as the other variables we employed, remains a broadly
defined variable. These measures do rest upon a familiar set of discrete acts by
managers: communicating the value and purpose of initiatives, showing commitment
with resources, striving for unity, providing clear guidance and standards, and
incorporating reviews. While we have not teased out these test items as separately
significant, their itemization here puts into perspective what employees have had to
consider in evaluating these broadly defined variables. It serves as a reminder to
managers of what discrete acts may have worked in unison to provide our results.
However, our own purposes direct us not to provide a cleaner delineation of each
variable, nor to understand their inner dynamics. Instead, having successfully
demonstrated their hypothesized relationship to inconsistency, we are interested in
finding evidence in the results that will validate the reasoning that led to that hypothesis.
The reasoning required considerable theoretical excursions, and inferential relationships.
In this analysis, we therefore do not look inward at the variables but now focus outward
on their interrelationships with each other, and with other concepts alluded to in the
literature review.
The interesting relationship between communication and participation represents
the first of several possible interrelationships between our variables which more
convincingly demonstrates that our initial association of them with inconsistency may,
indeed, have something to do with elaboration. A closer look will permit us to better
make a claim of causality to inconsistency, which until now rests on logic and inference.
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As a reminder, in our literature review, we hypothesized that these measures of
situational qualities provide the needed setting for consistent attitudes to emerge. Our
justification rested on the principles of the Elaboration-Likelihood Model. The ELM
establishes that both opportunity and motivation must be available for important
information-processing acts to transpire. To be clear, our causal logic lies on two fragile
premises. First, we chose our antecedent set because we felt they captured the twin
dynamics of the ELM. Unfortunately, the ELM has not previously been theorized to
relate to our antecedent set. We alone have established the plausibility of that link.
Second, the twin effects of opportunity and motivations have not even been previously
tested for an empirical link to consistency. We have suggested that sheer historical
oversight is to blame for this. Nonetheless, if our ultimate end was to establish that the
ELM is definitely at work (and that causality can be inferred by association with such a
strongly evidenced concept), we only have proxies and inference at our disposal. Our
extensive literature review attempted to provide the logic for those inferences. In
following the guidance by important voices within the attitude community, like Eagly
(1992), who have called for bolder cross-paradigmatic investigations, we have not
hesitated to make those inferential leaps between findings that have remained formerly
unrelated, or which speak a different language. But we have struck out on our own path
here. Our hypothesis inserts several mediating steps: a vague notion of conditions, as
well as elaboration which responds to those conditions. Figure 20 reveals the chain of
causality we have inferred. The ultimate test of our inferences lies with future studies.
However, in the present study we apply post hoc analysis of our results to see what
within those results may already support this proposed chain of causality.
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Antecedents

Conditions
Setting
Context
Climate
etc.

(+)

(+)
Elaboration

Consistency

Figure 20: Inferred Mediating Steps between Antecedents and Consistency

Our post hoc analysis begins with the different strengths of the individual
correlations in our study. Several interesting interrelationships in our results add greater
support for our passing evocation of terms like climate, environment, and conditions. As
a first exploration of their interrelationships we combined all five predictors in a
multivariate relationship to inconsistency. Table 6 shows the results. From this analysis,
we see that structured procedure dominates the others in effectiveness. With 5 separate
variables present which we have purported to function in a similar manner, the strength
of the structural procedure – even at only a .10 confidence level – shows a considerable
distinctive contribution relative to the others.
To continue with the comparative analysis, we then removed structured
procedure, and reviewed the results again. Doing this step by step, removing the
strongest remaining variable each time, we produced a rough sense of the dominance of
each variable in a crowded influential space. The second most significant of these
variables would be a rough tie between participation and managerial supportiveness,
which tend to crowd each other out at t<.21. Removing these, communication comes into
its glory (t < .0258) even in the presence of supervisor effectiveness, which appears least
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significant of these variables. Emerging from this picture is a hierarchy which we will
explore more closely.
Table 6: Multivariate Model of Predictors of Inconsistency

Looking at the individual strengths of these variables (i.e., in isolation) reveals a
similar sense of hierarchy. The strength of these effects ranges from .23 for leadership
supportiveness to .32 for structured procedure. Managerial supportiveness came in a
close second. Participation and communication produced identical correlations in the
middle of the pack. This is roughly the same picture that emerged from our multivariate
analysis. We must exercise caution, however, and not treat this hierarchy as hard and
fast. We consider them notional and approximate. First, each variable was produced
based on a different number of test items. Therefore, the fact that structured change
produced the strongest effect may be because it was created with the most test items.
More test items permit finer details (Petty & Krosnick, 1989; Frazier et al., 2004).
Similarly, the identical effects of participation and communication likely are not identical
because communication required 5 questions to achieve those results, while participation
required only 4. Lastly, managerial supportiveness, which was second strongest, had a
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correlation of .30 and required only 3 test items to produce that. All things equal, that
may have proven to be the most significant of the findings. The results, in the end, are
not normalized such that we could make hard comparisons.
Still, we must point out that the two variables that appear the strongest in both
multivariate and univariate analysis show some resemblance in two ways. Both
resemblances logically explain their supremacy within the pack, and help us to evolve our
understanding of these variables relative to inconsistency. The two variables that appear
strongest are structured procedure and managerial supportiveness. First, structured
procedure and managerial supportiveness both relate to top level aspects of the initiative.
They speak to the institution, and to acts that can only be related to institutional order.
The top-level variables we employed are the ones that should be most completely able to
send messages about efforts at the institutional level that addresses the entire initiative.
They convey a consistent message across the whole department that a strong, cohesive
plan exists. They convey that management has put money where their mouth is. They
convey unity of effort. Alternatively, participation and communication were not worded
in a way to summon a direct assessment of management. They read, “I have been able to
ask...” and “I have received…”. They do not directly implicate a particular
communicator agent and entity, and likely summon more salient or proximal
organizational structures (the chain of command) rather than the top level of the
organization. The difference between the top two and the lower-level variables may be
summarized as such: it is one thing to hear about commitment and purpose, it is another
to witness it in an institutional structure. Top-level variables instill faith and trust
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through demonstration; lower-level variables do so through communication, inclusion,
and more proximal relationships.
The differences between top-level and lower-level variables may be particularly
apparent in comparing managerial (department-level) effectiveness and supervisor
effectiveness. Both are 3 item measures, and are based on the identical question stems.
One is top-level, the other proximal. Feeling they are the most normalized of the
variables, their results differ enough to consider their differences as significant and
meaningful, rather than occurring through random error (r = .23 versus .30). We
conclude, therefore, that the perceived hierarchy is not arbitrary, but meaningful in its
own right. Such findings speak of the value of a pervasiveness of influence necessary to
foster well-structured attitudes, the kind of pervasiveness that occurs when a well-defined
environment or culture exists.
Structured procedure and management effectiveness share a second common
feature. Not only are they top level, but they are more encompassing constructs.
Although neither directly asks about communication and participation, neither can be
assessed positively without those having happened. A member cannot become aware of
metrics, program management activity, and resource availability without communication
having taken place and without having had to interact with the initiative. A high
correlation between structured procedure and communication seems to support that idea
that when structured procedure has taken place, so has communication (r = .70). A high
correlation between management effectiveness and communication draws the same
conclusion (r = .74). The two top-level variables may therefore be more inclusive of
other the influences in the environment. A certain logic permeates Table 6. The most
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interrelated of the variables are managerial supportiveness, structured procedure and
communication. Participation and supervisor effectiveness are less interrelated to the
other variables. A quick mediation test provides additional support for this belief.
Communication and Participation partially mediate the influence of structured procedure
on inconsistency (beta falls from -.20 to -.16 and -.15 respectively.) Managerial
supportiveness is similarly mediated (or explained) by these two more discrete measures
(beta falls from -.15 to -.05 and -.10 respectively.) The top level variables partially work
through the more discrete variables we tested. The top level variables appear to have a
stronger influence because they subsume the influences of more discrete managerial acts
within them. They are broader contextual variables. They offer more to an individual to
be able to strike upon elaboration.

Table 7: Correlations among Antecedents

Participation
Participation
Communication
Structured
Procedure
Managerial
supportiveness
Supervisor
Effectiveness

Communication Structured Managerial
Supervisor
Procedure supportiveness Effectiveness
1
.748
.479
.595
.405
.748
1
.700
.750
.459
.479
.700
1
.737
.457
.595

.750

.737

1

.612

.405

.459

.457

.612

1

We have tried to be cautious with a post-hoc analysis. Each of the pictures,
however, tends to draw the same conclusions. They each appear to be snapshots of the
same overarching relationship. The data appears amenable to the large leaps of inference
we took in proposing that our antecedents would function via the ELM. None of these
snapshots is conclusive, but each one further hints at broad environmental effects that
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foster the motivation to engage in elaboration. While they may hint at environment or
culture, we had other post hoc tests at our disposal which may more firmly establish that
link.
We applied two sets of tests. First, a selective additive multiple-regression test
would determine if the more discrete variables can amass to mimic what the broader
variables are able to accomplish. In short, we are looking for the non-redundancies.
Prior studies have not tested multiple regression, and may have missed these potential
effects. From a holistic perspective, discrete conditions should amass to create an even
more conducive environment. Our tests support this thinking, but only at a .10
confidence level. Participation + supervisor effectiveness are significant at this level.
Also, despite the strong correlations already mentioned, participation + structured
procedure work together at a .10 confidence level. Although the data is inconclusive as a
test, the fact that the least related of the variables came closest suggests that different
variables with less preexisting multicolinearity may have revealed additive effects.
Actions from managers may very well add up to foster an environment conducive to
elaboration.
The second test is much more conclusive. We tested whether certain plausible
culture types would mediate our antecedent set (Appendix D). This is a direct test of the
first inferential leap of Figure 20. We turned to a simple measure of culture validated by
O’Reilly (1991). This 7 item measure seeks to distinguish employees’ perceptions of the
prevailing culture, along such options as risk taking, attention to details, outcome
orientation, people orientation, team orientation, aggressiveness, and stability. We had
initially dismissed using this test and exploring culture as an antecedent to consistency
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because the measure available to us is a simplified version of more comprehensive tests
of culture. This simple measure, on its own, was not a highly publishable antecedent.
However, its utility is adequate for this post-hoc extension of our thinking.
Therefore, let’s first understand the nature of the measure and then look at the
results. The measure works such that individuals assess the appropriateness of each of
the seven qualities of culture. Therefore, they are not exclusive. A person could assess
all attributes as equally true (although that would be suspicious). The results of this
measure are compelling. First, all of the managerial techniques of our study correlated
strongly and positively to two of these seven cultural types, team orientation and people
orientation (range, r =.38 to .71). They also revealed a moderate correlation to attention
to detail and innovation (range, r = .18 to .49). They bore no relationship to outcome
orientation, aggressiveness, or stability. All of these findings make sense. Let’s just
look the top two types. Team orientation was described as “the degree to which work
activities are organized around teams rather than individuals.” And people orientation
was described as “the degree to which management decisions take into consideration the
effect of outcomes on people within the organization.” Taken together, these provide a
quick affirmation that the techniques by management occur concurrently with a culture
ostensibly focused on people and their concerns rather than foremost about corporate
goals. Moreover, the managerial technique that most strongly correlated to both culture
types was managerial supportiveness. The weakest correlation was supervisor
effectiveness. This hierarchy is consistent with what we previously saw. Namely, the
top-level variables tend to more strongly relate to the appropriate culture types and
conditions that one would expect for elaboration to occur (Table 8).
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Table 8: Correlations between Antecedents and Culture Types

Participation
Communication
Structured Procedure
Managerial
supportiveness
Supervisor Effectiveness

People-Oriented Culture
.54
.63
.56
.72
.50

Team-Oriented Culture
.52
.56
.52
.57
.35

Looking further, these two culture types also reveal a correlation to inconsistency
(team orientation, r = -.35; people orientation, r = -.24). In fact, team orientation amounts
to a stronger correlate than any of our hypothesized ones! Employees with greater
consistency more highly assessed the two dimensions of culture that describe the most
holistic environment of the seven. Additionally, the broader variable of the two, team
orientation, once again proved more strongly correlated than the lower-level culture,
people orientation.
Given these findings, it seemed appropriate to test mediation. These two types of
culture do, indeed, quite strongly mediate the influence of managerial techniques on the
level of consistency. Team orientation fully mediates all but structural procedure, which
it strongly but only partially mediates. People orientation similarly fully mediates all but
structural procedure and managerial supportiveness (again, only partial mediation). Yet
again, the culture type with the greatest mediating effect was the broader of the two
constructs, team-orientation (Table 7). This relational finding further supports the notion
that our antecedents work best insofar as they engender a broad sense of environment, or
culture.
106

Table 9: Mediation Effects of Culture Types on Antecedents

Participation
Communication
Structured Procedure
Managerial
supportiveness
Supervisor
Effectiveness

Beta of
Original
Relationship to
Inconsistency
-.129
-.140
-.206
-.153
-.114

Mediated Beta
(People-Oriented
Culture)

Mediate Beta
(Team-Oriented
Culture)

-.096
-.099
-.173
-.130

-.061
-.054
-.123
-.075

-.072

-.057

These last tests of culture, of all of our post hoc tests, most conclusively
substantiate our explanation for why this antecedent set works. Our antecedents
differentially contribute to or work in conjunction with an overarching culture or
environment. These findings give added credence that elaboration occurs due to the
amiability of the culture or climate. Admittedly, the culture claim does not evidence the
presence of elaboration. But it does push our logic further along by revealing the holistic
effects of our antecedents.

Recommendation for Action Regarding Antecedents
The next logical step for psychological research would be to test our causal
inferences. The validation may come from different angles. First, inconsistency research
should test the relationship between product terms of diverse latent “strength” variables
and inconsistency. A direct test may help substantiate that elaboration does actually
predict inconsistency. Also, as a test of another step of our causal inferences, future
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studies should test our contextual variables (i.e., participation and structured procedure)
against specific latent psychological variables. Do they, indeed, summon elaboration by
simultaneously providing opportunity and motivation, knowledge and vested interest?
In this post-hoc analysis, we have also proposed a new way to evaluate our
variables. They may function through a mediating concept of environment.
Sensemaking has begun to seek out social schema within the work place. Process models
of change consider organizational dynamics as well. Both fields seem as likely
candidates to study inconsistency in the workplace from a perspective of culture or
environment. In addition, numerous constructs could be summoned to test a direct
relationship to inconsistency. We employed a culture variable. However, future studies
may wish to consider trust, climate, and value congruence. Numerous managerial
attributes beyond what we have studied (e.g., fairness, integrity, competence, openness,
and benevolence) may prove an interesting inquiry relative to consistency. These relate
to what Van Dam et al. (2008) have referred to as the “daily work context (p. 314).”
Eagly espoused that good theory attracts followers (1992). We believe that our
reinvestigation of theory from a contemporary perspective should provide that new
theoretical foundation which may attract new followers to the field of inconsistency. We
have provided multiple new directions for future studies in this regard.
Our study has also provided direct evidence that should be of interest to
managers. All of our antecedents have linked actions from management to consistency.
If the claim of causality resonates, then the manger can better assess the activities
undertaken to help an initiative succeed. But why should consistency matter for success?
Because of the importance of this question, our remaining tests attempt to show the
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functional role of consistency in mediation and moderation of other effects. However,
prior studies have answered this for their respective contexts. Namely, consistency
permits the development of strong attitudes. If a manger can improve consistency,
members will more likely form these strong attitudes. Strong attitudes resist pressure to
slip or revert back during a transformation period. Peers, new counter-attitudinal
information, self-doubt, and changes in the environment (e.g., staff changes,
environmental mood changes) may threaten a supportive attitude along the way. Since
organization change occurs over a period of time, the strength of an attitude would appear
to be of relevance. Therefore, ways to strengthen an attitude should be a concern as
much as the common concern of changing an attitude.
Mediation
We hypothesized significant results regarding mediation. Two necessary steps of
mediation have previously been unsubstantiated. First, consistency would need to
positively correlate to overall attitude. Second, that inconsistency would need to relate to
our predictor set of participation, communication etc. The results support both of these
steps to develop a test of mediation.
Regarding the first, consistency did, indeed, occur more among those who
supported change than among those who resisted it (r = .25). This represents a new
finding. We substantiated this hypothesis based on the presence of contextual forces
present in our study, which have not been present in previous studies. These contextual
forces (our antecedents), we felt, would not only promote convergence but also a shift in
the bounds in which convergence may occur. Given the small size of this correlation, we
wanted to examine this unprecedented effect more closely. We wanted to ensure that the
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overall positive correlation did not occur in only certain sections of the continuum, but
rather across the entire continuum. To test for this, we discretized openness to change
into 2 and then into 3 parcels to determine if any different relationship between
inconsistency and openness to change emerged in that analysis. No aberrations emerged.
Moreover, ANOVA analysis revealed a continuing improvement of consistency as
attitude became more positive (at the .10 level of confidence which is considerably strong
considering the sample size). This additional scrutiny of correlation between consistency
and overall attitude permits us to more confidently interpret the mediation test.
Hypotheses 4a-4e predicted that consistency would mediate the relationship
between our antecedents set and attitude as a whole. Inconsistency passed the test for all
five antecedents. Participation, communication, structured procedure, and managerial
supportiveness, and supervisor effectiveness appear partially mediated.
These findings require us to ask why consistency would only produce a partial
mediation of management activities toward attitudes, and what value this partial
mediation serves. The mediated part of partial mediation states that certain actions by
management trigger consistency which enables a true, or – as Rosenberg added –
“irreversible” shift in attitude. This conforms to both inconsistency theory and the ELM.
Having found mediation, even partial mediation, provides a needed empirical support for
a theory that has evolved without evidence of this step. Therefore, we are pleased with
partial mediation. However, how do we address the unmediated influences of our
antecedent set? The unmediated part of the relationship between management actions
and attitude change permits two interrelated interpretations: a.) management techniques
have influence beyond what consistency can account for, b.) some attitudes have
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changed, but not become any more consistent. The first of these can be viewed
positively. Namely, given the many theories explaining how these management
techniques function, we may now add to that dialogue the evidence found here. That is
to say, acts by management can now also be explained by how they trigger attitudinal
consistency. Our aim was never to usurp credibility from any other model; nor does a
test of mediation necessarily do that (Frazier et al., 2004). The second interpretation,
specifying that attitudes have changed but have not become any more consistent, is a
challenge to the theory of attitude (but not an insurmountable one).
To consider the apparent conundrum that attitudes may have changed but
somehow surpassed the step of becoming consistent, let’s review Rosenberg’s initial
theories as well as the ELM. Inconsistency theory does, in fact, permit the possibility of
mere partial mediation. Rosenberg had demonstrated that an inconsistent attitude is an
unstable attitude, a searching or exploratory form of attitude. This means that the attitude
could shift between valences over time, be reversible. Therefore, some of the positive,
“changed” attitude could still be unstable attitudes, prone to eventually revert, or
eventually become more consistent at that location on the continuum. That being said, to
rely exclusively upon the idea of instability appears too much of a forced rationalization.
The ELM, from its intended integrative framework, provides a better explanation
of partial mediation. The ELM easily makes apparent that we should seek out coexisting
effects of, perhaps, importance, certainty, and latitude of rejection, etc. Answers for just
partial mediation may exist in such an investigation. For instance, some of the shifted but
inconsistent attitudes may coexist with a weak degree of certainty and importance.
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Partial mediation opens the doors to these further musings. In that regard, we find the
results more stimulating than perplexing, an important contribution to attitude research.
Both of these interpretations rationalize partial mediation based on theory. We
offer an alternative interpretation, though, that suggests that some of our assumptions
regarding mediation are incomplete. First, we must consider that some of the
occurrences of consistency may have gone unnoticed by our specific test of mediation.
Our test made the assumption that managerial techniques would produce a positive
impact on attitude and on consistency. However, is it also not reasonable to think that
managerial techniques may have caused consistency but a reactive shift towards the
negative? Again, this goes beyond our current empirical tests but the plausibility of it
has not gone unnoticed by prior researchers. Resistance studies have noticed that some
people will formulate strong antagonistic positions if they feel manipulated (O’Reilly,
1991). Moreover, participation could increase the anxiety and defensiveness one has, and
provide the proof that “change is not for me.” Just because management has employed
“proven” procedures does not mean that these procedures have met the threshold of some
ingrained emotional needs that Oreg (2003) discusses in his review of emotional forms of
resistance.
Another assumption we made is that our variables would produce elaboration
which necessarily leads to consistency. Elaboration may have occurred, but produced a
result we have not yet considered. Could not management techniques also produce the
exact opposite effect of consistency? Could techniques increase internal conflict and
leave it less likely to get resolved? Elaboration may, for some, be the equivalent of
removing ignorant bliss. Indeed, not all studies or theories concur with the logic that
112

“involvement variables,” such as what we have used, lead to consistency and stronger
attitude (Thompson and Zanna, 1995). For instance, highly involved respondents may be
more attentive to detail, including inconsistent information, and be more conscious of
ambiguous qualities (Erber & Fiske, 1984). Therefore involvement and elaboration, by
summoning greater conflicting detail, could itself lead to an arrested state of attitude
formation (Monson, Keel, Stephens, & Genun, 1982).
This evidence parallels an alternative viewpoint of attitudinal conflict that has
occurred within the confines of ambivalence research (but not within inconsistency
confines). While most have conceptualized ambivalence as a temporal, troubling state of
mind, others have pointed out that ambivalence may represent a wise or intellectuallydisposed state of mind. In this alternative view, inconsistency occurs with a clear and
comfortable awareness of dialectically opposed information (Williams & Aaker, 2002).
In accepting duality, the end state of elaboration may be different. The mind recognizes
the dialectic, but the mind does not treat it as an unstable dialectic, therefore does not
work to eliminate it (Holmes & Rempel, 1989). As Thompson and Zanna have
demonstrated with ambivalence, heightening information processing may trigger certain
personality types to do just the opposite, to develop conflicted attitudes (1995).
Thompson and Zanna found that individuals with a personality disposition of “Personal
Fear of Invalidity” would experience more ambivalence and more chronic ambivalence
than others. This notion has not been raised within inconsistency research, and it was
specifically downplayed by Rosenberg. Inconsistency has clearly been treated as a
bothersome an unnatural state within inconsistency research. As that perception slowly
erodes, these studies reveal that the models become more complicated. Looking at our
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study, certain more dialectically-tolerant individuals might form attitudes in support of
change, but these attitudes may still not rest on consistent evaluations. This would
suppress our mediation. In a post hoc analysis, our data does hint at the possibility that
individuals with Master’s degrees and above experienced more inconsistency in response
to management techniques (however, inconclusive at a .05 confidence level). Improved a
priori test design may specifically tease out these conflicting results in future studies.

Recommendations for Action Regarding Mediation
The existence of contradictory theories about the value or role of inconsistency
during attitude formation reveals an important threshold of knowledge regarding this
construct. We proposed consistency as a logical mediating step toward attitude change,
but this may not be the case for given individuals. Moreover, additional research
suggests that attitudes may not directly shift in a two step process from an inconsistent
form to a consistent one in this change process (Pratt & Barnett, 1997). The possibility of
fluctuations, suspensions, and retreats in the consistency process reveals the inherent
limitations of our mediation model. Our test only measured consistency at one particular
time in the change process. A better test for future studies would be to return to
Rosenberg’s initial methods of test-retest experiments in search of some of the multiple
dynamics suggested by the diverse literature. Or, in non-experimental studies, such as
might be more suitable for organizational change issues, longitudinal tests would have a
better chance to elucidate the amble of consistency over time. For attitude research, the
current findings of mediaiton are novel and important for setting up more complex tests.
For organizational behavior research, given the inherent limitation of a single measure of
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time, we consider the findings of the current study as an important first step to what
might be the realistic future application of consistency theory: process models.
The issue of time concerned Rosenberg in his early tests. Although he did not
deeply investigate how much time was necessary to accomplish consistency, time seems
a pertinent issue in the context of organizational transformation. Process models of
resistance have recognized the importance of time, and have provided conceptual stages
of an organization’s transformation. Each stage states the cognitive processes at play and
implies specific actions for management to undertake. Inconsistency as a temporal state
may align itself with certain cognitive stages of resistance. As Quinn and Kimberly have
stated, as the transformation process evolves, different combinations of values and
assumptions may be required (1984). By way of speculation, inconsistency may happen
at the initiation stage. “When change is initiated, existing patterns are disrupted and this
results in a period of uncertainty and conflict, (Quinn & Kimmberly, 1984, p. 303).”
Alternatively, inconsistency might occur throughout multiple stages, playing different
roles each time. Although Rosenberg identifies inconsistency as temporal, he does not
preclude the idea that it can be recurring. Such recurring inconsistency seems plausible
during transformation. Inconstancy might align with stages such as Isabella’s
anticipation where information is assembled (1990). Inconsistency could be inserted as
an augmentation to process models, as has been done with cynicism and skepticism
(which, by the way, may be interrelated with attitudinal conflict) (Stanley et al., 2005).
In making augmentations to process models, certain care may need to be taken in
the nature of the discussion and in the characterization of the function. We have already
asserted that inconsistency should force a reframing of the meaning of resistance because
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of how it reveals the interplay of support and resistance. Over and above that, one may
be able to make the claim that inconsistency, as a process step towards acceptance, also
has a positive role as opposed to a problematic role. This may truly help change the
discussion regarding the nature of resistance even further. While we identified
consistency as an important step of true attitude change, other findings have shown that it
could also be true that inconsistency may itself serve as a positive, mentally important
mediating step to attitude change as well. Several works suggest that ambivalence
induces important hyperactive information processing (e.g., Jonas, Diehl, &
Bromer,1997; Maio et al, 1996; Pratt & Barnett, 1997;). Pratt and Barnett conclude that
ambivalence may stimulate the unlearning process necessary for change. In conceptual
works, ambivalence may provide a beneficial sort of Socratic reasoning (e.g., Williams &
Aaker, 2002). Piderit has made a similar theoretical venture regarding organizational
change, suggesting that a strategy that intentionally fosters attitudinal conflict may serve
as an important step towards the change process (2000). Our work cannot comment on
this theory. It is, however, not incongruent without own findings. At different times,
both inconsistency and consistency could mediate change. A further exploration of this
would better link consistency concepts into process models of organizational change.
Moreover, finding beneficial properties of inconsistency in the change process would
further force us to qualify the standard perception of resistance as a hindrance and an
irrational response.
We reference process models largely because of their prominence. However,
most are presently somewhat insensitive to individual differences (Isabella, 1990).
Sensemaking research, however, may prove an even better fit for some of these ideas.
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First, like attitude research, sensemaking rests largely on concepts of schema. Second,
sensemaking emphasizes the role of ambiguous and incomplete information, which
appears amenable to the ideas of consistency. Third, sensemaking, already concurs with
the initiative to reconceptualize the nature of resistance. In short, process models have
made an important first step of recognizing that change is a dynamic process of shifting
context., but sensemaking permits a more individualistic picture. By way of speculation,
the following inclusion of inconsistency into sensemaking may occur. A fluctuating
contextual reality during organizational transformation might yield recurring novelty and
impressions into the attitude formation process, which could trigger a recurring process
of consistency seeking and sensemaking. We studied perceived management tactics in
our tests. However, couldn’t such perceptions change over time? Sensemaking adds to
this a litany of perceptual time-sensitive variables such as shifts in awareness of a
collective viewpoint, as well as shifts in social schema (Axelrod, 1976). Each of these
may relate to the ability to formulate well-structured attitudes.

Moderation
Numerous studies have found that attitudes predict behavior better for those with
a consistent attitude than for those with an inconsistent attitude. Our study did not.
While we do not fully discount that as a possible important null finding, four clear
methodological weaknesses have likely suppressed our results, and possibly caused the
test to fail: confounding influences on perceived and actual behavior, irregularities among
dependent variable raters, statistically inadequate measurement of the behavior, and the
abandonment of expectancy-value operationalization. We will address each in turn.
117

Confounding Influence of Perceptions. Our archival survey had asked managers
to assess their subordinates’ behavioral support. Unfortunately, this task is fraught with
difficulty. Numerous studies of resistance have demonstrated that individuals will feign
compliance. Conflicts between values, specifically, may produce feigned or symbolic
compliance, lip service, and other unenthusiastic behaviors (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008;
O’Reilly et al., 1991). If employees give a false appearance of support, then their actual
support for change (and their actual attitude) will likely be less apparent. This degree of
deception makes an independent measure of behavior challenging. One should expect a
weakened baseline between attitude and behavior, thus making moderation more difficult
to prove. Our baseline was .30. This is on the very low end of tests that have occurred
for inconsistency.
Perception and time cause a problem as well. Fishbein and Ajzen (1974), in their
important study of methods, categorized our measure of behavior as a “multiple act
criteria”, meaning it intended to subsume diverse acts across time. This has possible
implications for its accuracy. In our case, employers had to assess support based on a
slew of behaviors occurring over a period of time. If that support had changed over time,
and the supervisor noticed, what would be the correct assessment? If behavior had
changed, what is the likelihood that the manager would have noticed? These are timerelated problems that affect the accuracy of the assessment. The employee, on the other
hand, will likely provide an attitude assessment based on the most recent attitude
structure. A disconnect between time frames is not only possible but likely. One should
expect an increased error term with such a variable, which would also suppress our
attitude-behavior relationship.
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Thus far we have spoken of perception. The actual relationship between attitude
and behavior may also be eroded due to our given context. Mechanisms, responsibility,
and a culture of control may impose behavior upon employees, thus creating a weaker
relationship between attitude and behavior for any given moment of measurement (Lines,
2005). The more of such constraints and demands on behavior, the weaker the
correlation between attitude and behavior (Judge et al., 2001). Although induced
behavior may ultimately shift attitudes to be consistent with it (in line with dissonance
theory), dissonance restoration may not yet have occurred at the time of our
measurement. Therefore, ongoing organizational pressures may impinge on the
traditional attitude-behavior relationship (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; O’Reilly et al.,
1991; Smith-Doerr, 2006), robbing it of sufficient robustness, making moderation effects
an impractical endeavor. These issues do not occur in prior studies, which have studied
anonymous and free acts, such as voting or intentions of taking action. Testing for
moderation may require many more controls than we had in place.
Irregularities among raters. Employing independent raters infuses not only
perception challenges, but also irregularities among raters. Namely, each could interpret
the true meaning of each point on the Likert scale differently, as well as employ a
different variance in which to score their employees. In the current case, each supervisor
supervised few employees, therefore, we had 74 raters in action. One of the outcomes of
this is the presence of three 4+ standard deviation (sd) outliers in our behavior variable,
and five 3+ sd outliers in the data. In the case of the 4+ sd outliers, no supervisor number
had been assigned (i.e., missing data). Given the presence of a larger set of such
employees without a given supervisor number, no further technique presented itself to
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adequately deal with this data without corrupting other data. The remaining outliers
appear to have occurred as the extreme measures from supervisors who employed a far
wider variance in their internalization of the rating system. At any rate, not even
exploratory techniques of dummy variables and exclusion trials improved the data. The
data did not lend itself to moderation.
Statistical Inadequacies. The initial survey that produced this data employed a 5pt Likert survey for both the independent variable (IV) and the dependent variable (DV).
Attitude, the IV, consisted of 18 questions; behavior, the DV, consisted of just three. The
18 item test differentiated individuals very well for the attitude. Contrastingly, the DV
did not differentiate among individuals well at all. A total of 76 of the total 148 people
scored the exact average of 4 for the DV. Among those who scored a 4 on behavior
(DV), the attitude scores ranged from 41 to 90 – nearly the entire range of the sample (37
to 90). Someone representing every possible attitude toward change had therefore
received a behavioral score of a 4. Although it is highly unlikely that 76 individuals truly
embody the meaning of 4, the imprecision of our DV variable has made it appear such.
Figure 21 reveals the unusual correlation pattern and the residual pattern, which we
postulate has suppressed our baseline and interfered with moderation. This problem with
coarseness can be avoided with addition items or additional response options. Frazier
and colleagues (2004) recommend a 25-pt Likert, although few have met this standard.
In our case, not having control over the development of the survey left us with data that
was likely too coarse to capture moderation effects.
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Figure 21: Coarseness of Regression and Residuals

Expectancy-Values. Our measure of inconsistency abandoned Rosenberg’s
traditional expectance-value measuring device (Fishbein, 1963; Rosenberg, 1956; Scott,
1969). However, in sacrificing the more cognitively reflective approach of Rosenberg,
we likely suppressed the likelihood of identifying some inconsistencies. Take for
instance two of our questions, the first cognitive, the second, affective: “I look forward to
such changes” and “I find the changes pleasing.” Alternatively Rosenberg may have
asked the cognitive question, “How much does the change initiative affect your job
growth potential/image/the company’s future.” And the affective question may have
read, “Determine how much the following words describe the change:
threatening/satisfying/comforting/unsettling.” In choosing broad evaluations over
Rosenberg’ itemized evaluations, we may have failed to identify the meaningful
separation between affect and cognition. This too may have suppressed moderation.
Our mediation test provided evidence of an important functional role of
consistency. However, the null findings for moderation prevent us from stating broad
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implications for behavior which would interest managers. Therefore, extending the
functionality of inconsistency all the way to behavior eludes us. While we have linked
the roles of manager to the occurrence of inconsistency, we cannot provide evidence at
this time that managers should necessarily attend to this finding so as to better influence
behavior.

Recommendations for Action Regarding Moderation
Given these limitations of our behavioral variable, moderation was a challenging
endeavor. Employing multiple regression almost certainly made the likelihood of success
all the more feeble. However, since multiple regression appears to be the unqualified
standard today, we have not questioned that approach. Nor do we wish to disentangle the
respective contribution of data weakness and test type to explain the failure. Our study,
however, puts into perspective the possible contrivances in prior studies. With the
exception of Schleicher and colleagues (2004), the empirical support for inconsistency as
a moderator rests largely upon tests employing a contrived (ideal) contextual and
statistical reality, where environment played an insignificant role and where the standard
of median divide tests were employed. Our test, regardless of the source of the problem,
puts into perspective the precariousness of previous findings. Prior findings, we feel,
require revalidation to correct for both contrivances.

Proposed Areas for Inconsistency Research within Organizational Behavior
We studied broad constructs underlying inconsistency in our study. Oreg, on the
other hand, measured ambivalence in search of a specific conflict between attitude
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toward the change issue and toward the messengers (2011). Both inconsistency and
ambivalence permit innumerable models, allowing one to cater the model to very specific
issues. We consider a few enticing examples close to our own experiences.
Congress has initiated change to Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisitions on a
continual basis to improve management, to reduce costs, and to ensure accountability
(O’Neil, 2011). The seemingly endless reformation fuels accusations of an inherent
inability of the US government, as an entity, to successfully transform. The excuses and
accusations are numerous (e.g., Denett, 2008; Hutton, 2007; Wyld, 2003). However, we
are aware of no study implicating the resistance of employees en masse. We would like
to offer the countercultural perspective that the lack of attention to employee
psychological needs in the face of transformation may partially be to blame for failures of
DoD reform. Not to bring extra scrutiny to ourselves as DoD employees, but perhaps we
and our colleagues, as middle managers, are to blame, instead of top executives,
lawmakers and institutional oddities. Against the backdrop of continual change, one can
certainly imagine the potential for inconsistency within the reactions of DoD employees.
If the individual within DoD has experienced numerous reformations in a career, such an
individual with the best of intentions and the greatest of motivations could also display
resistance as a form on transformational malaise or cynicism towards change in general.
Considerable research on cynicism, skepticism and trust has occurred within
organizational behavior. A comprehensive work by Stanley and colleagues (2005) firmly
conceives of cynicism as an attitudinal construct. They define cynicism as doubts about
motives (either specific to the initiative or overall), and skepticism as doubting the
likelihood of success. Given the track record of Defense Acquisitions, both might appear
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to be worthwhile attitudinal studies. While Stanley et al. emphasizes the cognitive
aspects of cynicism, the closing remark indicate that the next step of analysis should
include a better understanding of how the different components of attitude interact during
cynicism. The study of attitude towards change within defense acquisitions would appear
a strong candidate in which to evaluate cynicism and partial cynicism, that is
inconsistency between a cynicism construct and some other evaluation. This
demonstrates the flexibility of the construct to address many potential issues.
We also invite readers to consider the application specifically related to activeduty military personnel. The military faces ever increasing pressures to change in
response to new enemies, economic cycles, political landscape, and social
transformations. We propose that whatever mythology enshrouds the military image in
stoicism and steadfast obedience, the human condition still mediates inner life and
behavior through attitudes. In fact, we argue that numerous unique forces exist within the
military which would make inconsistency and ambivalence more pronounced than
elsewhere. The counterbalancing and extreme forces of honor and sacrifice produce what
we feel is an ideal environment for attitudinal conflict. These conflicting forces exceed
what most civilian counterparts experience as a part of their job. On one hand, the
military provides its people excellent professional training, a sense of purpose, and
opportunities to excel and mature. On the other hand, in an effort to groom leaders, the
military requires regular relocations across the country, remote assignments away from
family, and regular deployments. A recent Pew Research survey asked military
members to respond to the positive and negative aspect so military life (Taylor et al.,
2011). The highest ranked positive aspects were pride, opportunities to mature, gains in
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self-confidence, and career skills. The negative related to family strains, and isolation
from civilian life. Although the study provided no empirical modeling of the kind that
we recommend, one can see the implicit understanding that life in the military is one
governed by conflicting evaluations. The reward of honor and dedication to country must
always be filtered through the sacrifice and hardship imposed on military members. As
such, attitudinal conflict may occur highly within the military. Organizational behavior
studies regularly investigate the reasons that active duty members leave the service. The
application of inconsistency may come to qualify traditional findings regarding the role
of family, age, and motivation.

Broader Significance of Research
The significance of the present research spans broadly across resistance studies as
well as inconsistency studies. By calling for follow up actions on each of our tests, we
have addressed new thresholds of knowledge evoked by our research. Beyond these, we
wish to return to the broad implications for reconceptualizing the nature of resistance, an
objective which gave rise to our project.
An important implication of these findings is that the occurrence of inconsistent
evaluations toward organization change should cause us to reconsider the value and
nature of resistance. Resistance generally has been viewed from the perspective of the
slighted manager, as a form of direct rejection of a valuable, inherently good objective
(Dent & Goldberg, 1999). The traditional viewpoint has purported that resistance
describes an irrational and dysfunctional act, a direct unwarranted and intentionally
detrimental act of rebellion (Ford et al., 2008). Such an act would be complete in its
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negativity, differing – as in older views of attitude – only in extremity. A growing body
of research is suggesting resistance is more nuanced. Our own research inserts the idea
of inconsistency as a qualifier to that image of complete, spontaneous, and purposeless
negativity.
The presence of inconsistent attitudes points out that the individual, in operating
within a broad mental attitudinal realm, has failed to resolve all competing values. The
many significant constructs that emerge within the field of resistance should make it
inherently obvious that an issue such as organizational change could not possibly appear
entirely positive or entirely negative to an employee. And yet, it is perhaps because of
the disjointed efforts of resistance research that this important starting point for our
analysis has been largely missed. The traditional viewpoint fails to consider that
resistance might be a rational product of evaluation (Jermier, Knights, & Nord, 1994).
The presence of inconsistency implies that even the negative construct called resistance
might have a purpose (or serve an individual need). If it has a point, it might have a good
point. Resistance might be of value to a corporation. As a qualified variation of
resistance, inconsistency might point out that managers have failed to represent the
proposal correctly, failed to meet the employee’s psychological needs, or actually made a
proposal that contains bad elements for its stated objective. A qualified variation of
resistance takes the initial step of what Ford, Ford, & McNamara describes as a necessary
reframing of the manager-employee relationship (2002). Our findings give additional
impetus to those calls.
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Conclusion
Attitudes have demonstrated an ability to subsume many influences and
experiences, and to effectively represent the critical functions that we employ for
interacting with the world, namely information processing and learning. These findings
constitute one of the largest bodies of knowledge within social psychology. For a
science employing disparate emotional and cognitive constructs, the employment of
attitudes permits a well-evidenced alternative framework, and perhaps a simpler form, for
viewing those influences. Moreover, as this study has demonstrated, this rich literature
contains within it more complex constructs that have not yet been employed within
resistance studies.
Our tests of one of these constructs, inconsistency, have shown that the formation
of a consistent attitudinal structure may play a part in the persuasion process. This was
our test of mediation. Also, our study has shown which actions management may take in
increasing that consistency. This was our test of correlation. Through these tests, this
study has accomplished much of what it intended for the field of organizational behavior.
We have, first, shown a functional role for a new construct, which may be added to the
expanding group of studies emphasizing the micro-perspective. Second, we have
elucidated the important steps for managers in this new model.
As an ulterior motive for this study, we have also accomplished important
findings for inconsistency research. Our results represent the first substantial evidence of
antecedents in this field. In the confirmation of our main hypotheses, we have taken a
different approach to the task, and have had to make certain inferences in applying
theory. We have, therefore, set the stage for a more comprehensive, belated, and we
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believe highly invigorating investigation of the theories upon which we have relied. The
failure to find moderation similarly charges the science with additional modeling
considerations which may go beyond what inconsistency can currently explain and
accomplish on its own. We have thus pushed the model to test its limits.
Lastly, our research comments on the nature of resistance. While numerous
approaches now exist to qualify the traditionally pervasive perspective of resistance as
inherently negative, ours contributes a specific variable, which, in its very construct,
challenges that notion. The attitude structure that may generate resistant-like behaviors
has received an important qualification through the discussion of inconsistency.
Attitudes contain multiple dimensions, requiring a closer and more appreciative look at
the individual. The current study adds voice to the speculation that current methods may
be fostering a disadvantageous and anachronistic dialogue regarding the individual.
Social psychology has numerous such strength constructs to contribute to this discussion.
Resistance studies already recognize the components of affect and cognition, and would
appear able to adapt its viewpoint to consider these multidimensional views of attitude.
Our study, therefore, takes an important step toward a potentially very fertile expansion
of resistance studies through a more robust view of attitude.
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Appendix A. Questionnaires
Openness to Change
When answering the following questions, think about the change your
organization has undergone over the last three years.
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly
agree
1. I tend to resist the change
2. I don’t like the changes
3. The changes happening in my organization frustrate me.
4. I would suggest these changes for my organization.
5. Most of the changes are irritating.
6. I hesitate to press for such changes
7. I look forward to such changes at my organization.
8. The changes will benefit my organization
9. Most organization members will benefit from the changes.
10. I am inclined to try the changes.
11. I suppose the changes
12. Other people would think that I support the changes.
13. The changes help me perform better at work.
14. The changes tend to stimulate me.
15. The changes help improve unsatisfactory situations at my organization.
16. I do whatever possible to support the changes.
17. I find going though these changes to be pleasing.
18. I benefit from the changes.
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Behavior
For the three items below, please assess ….. of the state IT organization.
Scale: 1 = Poor, 2 = marginal, 3 = adequate, 4 = good, 5 = excellent
1. Demonstrates a positive attitude towards ongoing improvement activities.
2. Demonstrates a commitment to our ongoing improvement activities
3. Supports the department in improving our ongoing improvement activities.

Structured Procedure
Think about the improvement activity in your IT department recently and
rate the level of agreement with the following statements.
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly
agree

1. These activities use a structured (defined) process
2. These activities use program management approaches (project charters, a time
plans, etc.)

3. These activities use objectives and performance metric to promoste
improvement progress.
4. These activities use detailed action item follow-up approaches.
5. The employees adhere to the defined procedures for improvement or change.
6. These activities were not implemented using any defined procedure for
change.
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Participation
1. I have been able to ask questions about the changes at work before they
were implemented.
2. I have been able to participate in implementing changes at work.
3. I have had some control over implementing changes at work.
4. I am able to have input into decisions being made about the changes at
work.

Communication
1. The information I have received about the changes at work has been
timely.
2. The information I have received about the changes at work has been useful
3. I understand what I am supposed to do on my job after these changes are
implemented.
4. The information I have received adequately answers my questions about
the changes at work.
5. I have received adequate information about the changes at work before
they were implemented.

Managerial supportiveness
1. Overall, the management of my IT department has led the implementation
of change effectively.
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2. Generally, the management of my It department has been able to unit the
employees to make these changes a success.
3. Management of my It department has taken steps to provide the resources
needs for changes.

Supervisor Effectiveness
1. Overall, the management of my IT department has led the implementation
of change effectively.
2. Generally, the management of my It department has been able to unit the
employees to make these changes a success.
3. Management of my It department has taken steps to provide the resources
needs for changes.

Culture
Assess where your IT department falls on each of the 7 dimensions listed
below from “Very low” to “Very high.”
Scale: 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = neutral, 4 = high, 5 = very high.
1. Innovation and Risk taking: The degree to which employees are encouraged to
be innovative and take risks.
2. Attention to detail: The degree to which employees are expected to exhibit
precision, analysis, and attention to detail.
3. Outcome orientation: The degree to which management focused on results or
outcomes rather than on techniques and processes used to achieve those
outcomes
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4. People orientation: The degree to which management decisions take into
consideration the effect of outcomes onpeople within theorganziation.
5. Team orientation: The degree to which work activities are organziaed around
teams rather than individuals.
6. Aggressiveness: The degree to which people are aggressive and competitive
rather than easygoing.
7. Stability: The degree to which organizational activities emphasize
maintaining the status quo in contrast to change.
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Appendix B. Tests of Significance

Figure 22: Age and Education
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Figure 23: Overall Attitude and Inconsistency
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Figure 23: Time Employed and Time in Position
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Figure 24: Gender
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Appendix C. Tests of Antecedents

Figure 26: Antecedents -- Participation and Communication
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Figure 27: Antecedents -- Structured Procedure and Managerial supportiveness
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Figure 28: Antecedent -- Supervisor Effectiveness
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Appendix D. Post hoc Analysis: Cultural Mediation of Predictors

Figure 25: Participation/Communication to Team Orientation
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Figure 26: Structured Procedure/Managerial supportiveness to Team Orientation

142

Figure 27: Supervisor Effectiveness to Team Orientation
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Figure 28: Mediation of Participation/Communication by Team Orientation
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Figure 29: Mediation of Structured Procedure/Managerial Supportiveness by Team Orientation
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Figure 30: Mediation of Supervisor Effectiveness by Team Orientation
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